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RECONSTRUCTING WORLD POLITICS:
NORMS, DISCOURSE, AND COMMUNITY
Sungjoon Cho*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the conventional (rationalist) approach to world
politics characterized by political bargain cannot fully capture the new
social reality under the contemporary global ambience where ideational
factors such as ideas, values, culture, and norms have become more salient
and influential not only in explaining but also in prescribing state behaviors.
After bringing rationalism’s paradigmatic limitations into relief, the Article
offers a sociological framework that highlights a reflective, intersubjective
communication among states and consequent norm-building process.
Under this new paradigm, one can understand an international organization
as a “community” (Gemeinschaft), not as a mere contractual instrument of
its contracting parties (Gesellschaft). The Article applies the new paradigm
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as it describes the WTO’s
institutional evolution from a power-oriented, tariff-reducing contract to a
norm-oriented world trade community.
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INTRODUCTION

Two months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) gathered in the Qatari capital, Doha.
Glued by the exigency of the time, they launched an audacious trade
negotiation round for the main purpose of reducing or eliminating chronic
agricultural protection in developed countries.1 WTO members were
desperate to send the post-9/11 world a clear message that would
reverberate even to the marginalized lands: “development.” To the
embarrassment of the WTO itself and its members, a decade of tedious, and
torturous, talks hardly delivered anything, leaving the Doha Round in
tatters.2 While the Doha crisis must be one of the darkest hours of the
WTO’s history, it offers, in irony, a rare opportunity to testify about the
gestalt of an international organization. Its conventional postmortems
invariably assign the debacle to the lack of convergence in trade interests of
key negotiating members, such as the U.S., the EU, China, and India.3 This
1

In the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001, WTO members highlighted that “the
majority of WTO members are developing countries” and agreed to “place [developing
countries’] needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this
Declaration.” World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶
2, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
2
See generally, Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round
Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573 (2010) (analyzing the history of the Doha Round’s
decade-long negotiation stalemate).
3
See e.g., Alan Beattie, Hopes Fade for Accord at Doha Talks, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 22,
2011 (highlighting fissures among the U.S., the EU, Brazil, and China on various issues,
such as cotton subsidies); Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Contemplating Doha
Failure, WTO Members Look to Paris Meeting for Way Forward, 15 BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE
NEWS
DIGEST,
May
25,
2011,
at
1,
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perspective betrays a firm premise that the WTO is an instrument that
coordinates and channels its (major) members’ positions, which are
ultimately informed by their domestic politics. That is, WTO members’
national interests determine what the WTO does, and perhaps more
importantly what it is. This perspective, which presupposes individualized,
profit-maximizing states, is subject to a positivist methodology4: it explains
why and how states behave in a particular situation. This thread of thought,
loosely coined “rationalism,”5 is a dominant paradigm among contemporary
international relations (IR) scholars.6 Under a rationalist lens, the Doha
Round is no more than a deal fallen apart.
Rationalism certainly holds great explanatory power over state
behaviors. It would be disingenuous to say that states do not pursue
material (economic) interests. Still, however, rationalism does not, and
cannot, elucidate how those WTO members form the titular “interests” in
the first place, and equally importantly, how the WTO, qua organization,
shapes such formation. While states communicate with one another as
social actors, rationalism simply brackets such ideational factors as ideas,
values, norms,7 discourse,8 and learning, which do influence, and even
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly15-19.pdf (observing gaps in
negotiating parties’ positions as “unbridgeable”); Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev.,
Deeply Divided, WTO Members to Search for Common Ground on Doha, 14 BRIDGES
WKLY.
TRADE
NEWS
DIGEST,
May
26,
2010,
at
1,
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly14-19.pdf (pointing out that WTO
members failed to agree on “common terms of engagement”).
4
See Steven Smith, The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social
Science?, 2 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L REL. 374, 375 (2000) (contending that positivism is so
dominant as a methodology, in particular in the United States, that it tends to marginalize
other epistemological approaches).
5
Two strands of IR theories stand out under the banner of rationalism depending on
main parameters: realism (neo-realism) characterizes an IO as a mechanism reflecting
interest of powerful states, while liberalism (neo-liberalism and neo-liberal
institutionalism) focuses on the utilities that an IO offers to its members, such as the
reduction of transaction costs. See infra Part I.A–B.
6
See Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50
WORLD POL. 324, 324 (1998) (observing that the neorealist-neoliberal debate has been
central within IR for the past decade).
7
Although scholars in a wide range of disciplines have used social norms as an
analytical device, social norms can be defined as a set of criteria for “appropriate behavior
for actors with a given identity” in understanding social construction. Martha Finnemore &
Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887,
891 (1998); see also Matthew J. Hoffmann, Norms and Social Constructivism in
International Relations, in 8 INT’L STUD. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert A. Denemark ed., 2010).
Cf. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS xiii (1987) (arguing that “norms and
behaviour should become more closely integrated in economic theory”).
8
In this article, the term “discourse” is used in a generic sense referring to an
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determine, state behaviors.9 After all, the WTO membership cannot be
reduced simply to a bargaining privilege; it also represents a common set of
beliefs shared collectively by WTO members, with or without cost-benefit
calculations.10 From this perspective, one might render a different
explanation for the Doha failure. The true failure of the WTO members
might be the failure to establish a shared normative ground among
themselves over the cause of development that the Doha Round was
supposed to espouse (“Doha Development Agenda”).11 Major WTO
members never factored development into their interest matrices through
adequate discursive interactions. Development never morphed into the
WTO’s social structure based on which WTO members self-evaluate their
particular behaviors as appropriate or not.12 Under this framework, the
Doha Round is a failed community-building project.
These two distinct frameworks—rationalist and sociological—can
apply in general to other international organizations (IOs). Under a
rationalist framework, an IO is merely a tool that states create to maximize
their material interests. With the ex ante institutional choice and design,
states pre-program an IO to facilitate interstate cooperation to reduce
transaction costs and stabilize expectations. However, rationalism does not
exhaust perspectives on IOs. In an alternative view, an IO may be defined
as a community that emerges, rather than being created by its members,
based on the aforementioned socio-cognitive properties. 13 This Article
aims to animate the latter—“sociological”—framework that remains
hitherto under-explored in international studies.14 Importantly, the starkly
“interactive process by which ideas are conveyed” without any “post-modern baggage.”
Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and
Discourse, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303, 305 (2008).
9
Regarding this line of thought (“constructivism”), see infra Part II.B.
10
José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
324, 338 (2006) (observing that “the ideas, shared understandings, and norms (soft and
hard) that emerge from participation in IOs [International Organizations] ‘constrain and
enable choices’ for states”).
11
Cho, supra note 2, at Part III.
12
Regarding the “logic of appropriateness,” see infra note 185.
13
See Two Approaches, infra note 14, at 389 (observing that “institutions are often not
created consciously by human beings but rather emerge slowly through a less deliberative
process”).
14
One of the earlier ventures to apply sociology to international law can be found in
Max Huber’s work. While emphasizing collective interests among states, Huber still
recognized a special status of powerful states (“Machtrecht”), especially in his early work.
See Jost Delbrück, Max Huber’s Sociological Approach to International Law Revisited, 18
EUR. J. INT’L L. 97, 97–98, 109–11 (2007). Subsequently, Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal also pursued “the global common interest in approximating a world public order
of human dignity.” Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International
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different prescriptions that these two frameworks generate over a failure of
interstate cooperation justify the urgent need for the alternative approach.
Those who advocate rationalism would propose to refurbish the machinery
of bargaining, while those who adopt the sociological framework might be
more interested in community-building agendas.
The baseline of this Article is that we are accustomed to perceiving
an IO through its creators, i.e., sovereign states. The conventional
paradigm of an IO may be best depicted as a global “Gesellschaft,”15 a
contractual relationship that sovereign states establish to achieve a certain
functional (regulatory) goal, be it the promotion of free trade or the
prevention of climate change.16 Here, particular political outcomes may be
attributed eventually to calculative individual actions and interactions,
rather than to endogenous norms provided by an IO itself.17 To this extent,
an IO may be viewed as an “empty shell” that states manipulate to attain
their desired goals.18
Methodologically, rationalism’s characteristic
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 76–77 (2006). Yet this sociological approach has often been
criticized as lacking interest in the “effectiveness” of international law. Id. More recently,
international scholars, in particular those who take international organizations seriously,
have begun to pay more attention to a sociological framework in understanding state
behaviors. For example, José Alvarez viewed compliance pull as a sociological
phenomenon. Alvarez, supra note 10. In a similar vein, Jutta Brunnée submitted that IOs
“socialize[]” states and lead them to internalize norms generated within IOs even without
material (cost-benefit) considerations. Id. (referring to the reliance on the concept of
socialization based on IO membership by Jutta Brunnée and other scholars). Robert
Keohane called a sociological approach a “reflexive” approach in contrast with a rationalist
approach, yet he criticized that a sociological approach generally lacks a coherent “theory.”
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379,
381, 393 (1988) [hereinafter Two Approaches].
15
See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 223–31 (GEMEINSCHAFT UND
GESELLSCHAFT) (Charles P. Loomis trans. & ed., 1957), reprinted in MARCELLO TRUZZI,
SOCIOLOGY: THE CLASSIC STATEMENTS 145–54 (1971) [hereinafter The Classic
Statements]. Tönnies wrote about the dichotomy between Gesellschaft (“society”) and
Gemeinschaft (“community”) found in human interactions and group dynamics. Tönnies
defined Gesellschaft as an artificial human connection built by people who possessed an
intent to work together, whereas Gemeinschaft was a natural human connection arising out
of birth or family. Id.
16
Cf. FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS: AN ESSAY ON THE
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 52 (1881) (viewing that
“economical calculus” in opposition to ethical deliberation was particularly relevant to
“war and contract”).
17
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational
Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736–39 (1984) (observing that
utilitarianism as an ideology interprets actions as based on calculated decisions).
18
See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons From the Rational
Choice Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 133 (1989).
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Epicurean propensity for parsimony (“the propensity to account for all
appearances from as few principles as possible”)19 does not address
“accounts based on post hoc observation of values or ideology.”20 In other
words, it “limit[s] the number of variables that a theory considers,” which
“can increase both its explanatory content and its capacity to concentrate the
scholarly mind.”21 Therefore, a “technical analysis of a very high order”22
may produce many useful research projects, which not only offer
convincing narratives on an IO’s present operation but also hold a
prognostic force on its evolution.
Useful as it may be, rationalism is nonetheless prone to paradigmatic
blind spots, presenting a largely curtailed picture of contemporary IOs and
their relationships with states. Most of all, rationalism’s very assumption
does not envision cognitive-normative properties of state action.23 Yet,
states’ strategic (rational) choices, which are informed by their (rationally
structured) national interests, cannot be made in a vacuum. States are not
just “calculating automatons”24; they also may be “interpretive.”25 Their
alleged rational choices are not to be merely deducted from the “tightly
defined, pre-packed sets of motives.”26 There must be an explicit
explanation as to how these interests (preferences) are formed,27 such as
through “frames of reference, moral templates and normative
orientations.”28 States, as well as their actions, are in fact deeply
“embedded” in their socio-cultural settings, which are beyond their control,
such that a purely utilitarian (profit-maximizing) paradigm becomes
nonsensical.29
The ever-intensifying interdependency fueled by both the yin and
19

SEN, supra note 7, at 24.
Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 392.
21
Id.
22
SEN, supra note 7, at 8.
23
Id. at 15.
24
Colin Hay & Daniel Wincott, Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism, 46
POL. STUD. 951, 952 (1998).
25
Stephen Bell, Institutionalism: Old and New, in GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, POLICY
AND POWER IN AUSTRALIA 1, 8 (Dennis Woodward, Andrew Parkin & John Summers eds.,
2002).
26
Id.
27
Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative
Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 1, 8 (Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo eds., 1992).
28
Bell, supra note 25; see also THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
29
This theoretical position is called “historical institutionalism.” See Thomas A.
Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27 COMP. POL. 231,
237 (1995) (book review).
20
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yang of globalization also warrants a sociological framework in that it
offers a compelling analytical framework under which one can
systematically reconstruct our conventional way of understanding of an IO.
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent “postnational constellation”30
instilled a strong sense of collectivity (“mentalités collectives”)31 in the
Hobbesian international sphere.32 Here, the sociological approach defines
states as social actors, rather than atomistic individuals.33 The internal
dynamics among social actors both condition and constitute their own
perception of challenges and responses, which conventional IR theorists
tend to discount.34 Therefore, the sociological paradigm is capable of
probing those issues that rationalism removes from the research agenda
under its own assumptions.35 In particular, this Article employs an IR
version of a sociological framework, i.e., “constructivism.”36 While
30

JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 176 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2006)
[hereinafter DIVIDED WEST] (“In spatial, social, and material respects, nation-states
encumber each other with the external effects of decisions that impinge on third parties
who had no say in the decision-making process. Hence, states cannot escape the need for
regulation and coordination in the expanding horizon of a world society that is increasingly
self-programming, even at the cultural level.”).
31
John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993) [hereinafter Territoriality].
32
See Thelen & Steinmo, supra note 27.
33
Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations, 41
INT’L ORG. 335, 366 (1987) (arguing for a theory that posits the state as a particular kind of
social actor that is “an inherently social entity, rather than as a Hobbesian primitive
individual”).
34
Id.
35
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 337 (1996) (book review) (observing that realism and
neoliberalism treat certain questions as assumptions and remove them from the research
agenda whereas institutionalism’s framework allows questions about issues such as the
origin and nature of states).
36
The pedigree of constructivism dates back to the 1950s when Karl Deutsch
“highlighted the importance of identity formation measured by social transactions and
communications.” Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and
Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COL. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 26 (2000) (quoting Peter J. Katzenstein et al., International
Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645, 654 (1998)). See
generally KARL W. DEUTSCH ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
AREA: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (1957).
Yet the term (“constructivism”) was coined by Nicholas Onuf in 1989. See Brunnée &
Toope, supra note 36 (citing NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING:
RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY ch. 1 (1989)). There are many different forms of
constructivism. In this article, I draw mainly on a modest (thin) form of constructivism
that Alexander Wendt developed along the line of “structurationist and symbolic
interactionist sociology.” ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
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admitting that power and interest still matter in terms of their causal
(determinative) effect on state behaviors, constructivism nonetheless
emphasizes the constitutive role of ideas and norms on such materialistic
factors as power and interest.37 In other words, “power and interest
explanations presuppose ideas.”38 Therefore, constructivists focus on
certain “discursive conditions,” which may justify a rationalist
explanation.39
Constructivism enables us to conceptualize an “imagined
community” that exists in a cognitive dimension comprised of norms and
legal discourses.40 Under this constructivist Weltanschauung, an IO’s
norms function as a language by which members of the IO communicate
among one another, thereby understanding and predicting each others’
behaviors, instead of simply attempting to outmaneuver their fellow
members.
Through norms qua medium (language), participants’
communicative competence transforms into administrative power that can
effectively coordinate their behaviors.41 In this community (Gemeinschaft)
conceptualized within an IO, one can envision the “enlarged mentalities”
under which we can “compare[] our judgment with the possible rather than
the actual judgments of others” and “put[] ourselves in the place of any
other man.”42
Suppose that an IO member claims that its measure is consistent
with IO norms. The eventual reception of this member’s validity claim by
others—the legal interpretation—hinges on the “context-dependent
acceptability of reasons.”43 That is to say, the member’s claim originates
from its own perspective, which may be sustained unless challenged by
another member. Another member may attempt to invalidate the measure at
issue by exposing it to “better reasons and context-altering learning
POLITICS 1 (1999). See also Stefano Guzzini, A Reconstruction of Constructivism in
International Relations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 147, 148 (observing that constructivism is
inherently eclectic).
37
WENDT, supra note 36, at 135 (arguing that power and interest are still important but
constituted more by ideas and emphasizing the constitutive, not causal, nature of ideas).
38
Id. (emphasis original).
39
Id.
40
Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, 3
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 319, 327 (1997); see also BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2d ed., 1991).
41
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 150 (William Rehg trans., 1992)
[hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS].
42
Id. at 148 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT § 40 (John Henry
Bernard trans., 1951)).
43
Id. at 36.
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processes.”44 Thus, norms channel social actors’ behaviors via the
“reasoning process,” which is operated by discursive merits and
generalizable rules.45
Nonetheless, this Article neither denounces rationalism nor
oversubscribes to constructivism.46 The presence of global norms does not
automatically translate into an immediate revision of a state’s strategic
balance sheet. Political gravitational force is always at large. The “political
survival calculus” in the minds of domestic politicians bound by short-term
election cycles may interfere with or delay certain socio-cognitive
transformations within an IO.47 Ideas and discourse do not always
guarantee institutional changes within an IO. These cognitive factors might
prove futile in the face of “crystallized ideas about rationalist interests.”48
What this Article does argue is that the old politics driven by the old
paradigm cannot prevent the new social reality around IOs from emerging.
Many international regulatory challenges that the world faces today,
ranging from global poverty to climate change, may require structural,
systemic, and long-term solutions, which a conventional bargain model
based on a routine power politics or strategic cost-benefit analysis alone
cannot fully embrace on account of its inevitable paradigmatic limitations.
Those challenges call for a soul-searching discourse and deliberation among
members of an IO and their nationals on such issues as values, goals, and
their collective identities that the IO represents. Although constructivism
should not simply bracket those “things out there,” such as military and
economic power,49 it can certainly lay bare that even these material
elements “take on significance as states develop shared expectations

44

Id.
FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS
OF PRACTICES AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS 43 (1991) (arguing that rules and norm guide choices via deliberation and
discourse on the merits and “cast in terms of universalizable rules”).
46
Of course, constructivism could, and should, not claim a disciplinary monopoly in
understanding the WTO. “[N]o approach can sustain claims to monopoly in truth—even on
useful insights.” John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together?: NeoUtilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 882 (1998)
[hereinafter Neo-Utilitarianism].
47
See AUDIE KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
APARTHEID (1995).
48
Vivien A. Schmidt, Taking Ideas and Discourses Seriously: Explaining Change
through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth “New Institutionalism,” 2 EUR. POL. SCI.
REV. 1, 16 (2009).
49
See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 134
(1999).
45
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through interaction.”50 Insofar as the old paradigm is unbefitting for these
kinds of ideational factors in addressing new realities in the international
field, a new perspectival endeavor, such as one proposed in this Article,
should complement the conventional approach.51 On balance, an IO’s true
reality may best manifest as a double helix structure52 of the two paradigms,
under which any single paradigm may not claim its disciplinary
monopoly.53 As a construct, an IO’s community (Gemeinschaft) is not only
a constraining environment to its members: it is also an “enabling” structure
that generates and even facilitates their purposeful behaviors.54
50

Id. at 128.
See Peter J. Katzenstein et al., International Organization and the Study of World
Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645 (1998); James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v.
Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 53
(Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (arguing that a “cross-paradigmatic” discourse between
rationalism and constructivism can lead to a better understanding of world politics).
52
I owe this insight to Professor Joseph Weiler. See also Katzenstein et al., supra note
51, at 682 (emphasizing the complementarity between rationalism and constructivism).
53
The “structuration” theory may help elucidate this mutually complementary nature
of rationalism and constructivism. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS
IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 69
(1979). The structuration theory objects to structural determinism and emphasizes an
ontological role of human agency. It “join[s] agents and structures in a ‘dialectical
synthesis’ that overcomes the subordination of one to the other, which is characteristic of
both individualism and structuralism.” Wendt, supra note 33, at 356. It also
accommodates insights from historical institutionalism by arguing that “social structures
are inseparable from spatial and temporal structures, and that time and space must therefore
be incorporated directly and explicitly into theoretical and concrete social research.” Id.
Under the structuration theory, an IO as a social structure maintains the “duality” of
structure. IO members (actors) and the IO (structure) are “mutually constitutive yet
ontologically distinct” entities by “giving agents and structures equal ontological status.”
Id. at 338–39, 360. They are “co-determined”: an IO is the result of its members’ intended
actions and interactions, while these actions and interactions are at the same time mediated
by the unique context of the IO’s community that is not necessarily reducible to its
members. Id. at 360. For example, within the context of the European Union (EU), while
members determine its original constitutional architecture (inter-governmentalism), the
EU’s supranational governance takes over once it is created by members and subsequently
shapes members’ culture and identities. See notably JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR? AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 30 (1999) (observing that the original decisionmaking process had “strong supranational elements” and that the European Commission
had “virtually exclusive proposal-making competence”).
54
The neorealist bias according to which norms are imposed as constraints on social
actors fails to recognize norms’ “enabling” function. While actors are subject to norms,
actors’ practices alter the normative structures by which they “share meanings,
communicate intentions, criticize claims and justify choices.” Kratochwil, supra note 45,
at 61. On the other hand, many constructivist explanations might be also consistent with
the conventional IR paradigms in terms of “chang[ing] the material incentive structure of
51
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Against this background, this Article first spotlights the increasing
unfitness of the conventional paradigm (Gesellschaft) in fully apprehending
what is happening with IOs and then offers an alternative paradigm
(Gemeinschaft) to gain a more complete understanding of them. This
paradigm shift from a bargaining model to a community model also
connotes a deontological project that attempts to institute more dutysensitive pathways in an IO’s operational mechanism that used to be
dominated largely by material incentives such as power and interests. In a
methodological sense, the Article’s empirical undertaking of the WTO
tends to enrich constructivist legal scholarship by “specify[ing] when, under
what conditions, and to what extent, state behavior is shaped by social
structure.”55
The Article unfolds in the following sequence. Part I first delineates
major properties of rationalism. This Part observes that the conventional
image of an IO is a contractual (treaty-borne) tool—a global Gesellschaft—
for sovereign states to achieve certain functional (regulatory) goals. It then
highlights how the conventional paradigm has increasingly become inapt in
the face of the postnational constellation in which the Cold War focus of
narrow national interests is rapidly losing ground, if not disappearing
entirely. Part II then turns to constructivism as a sociological attempt to
reconstruct an IO from a functional tool (Gesellschaft) to a community of
law (Gemeinschaft) where ideational factors, such as norms and culture, can
bond members in a sociological sense.
Part III offers a case study on the WTO and the new (constructivist)
paradigm presented in this Article. This Part first addresses the old
paradigm’s analytical deficiency. It underlines the altering environment
around the WTO, such as the global supply chains, which has made the
global Gesellschaft model increasingly incapable of accurately reflecting
the WTO’s actual, not hypothetical, operation. This Part also accuses the
old paradigm of normative paucity (protectionism) that continues to
undermine the global trading system. Concomitantly, Part III critically
observes that an increasing number of diverging domestic regulations, albeit
legitimate (non-protectionist) ones, cannot simply be bargained away under
the old paradigm.
It then proposes that the WTO’s community
(Gemeinschaft) is a conscious undertaking to overcome the aforementioned
descriptive and normative challenges.
their targets by raising the costs of existing practices.” Brian C. Rathbun, Uncertain about
Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International
Relations Theory, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 533, 551 (2007) [hereinafter Uncertainty].
55
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2003).
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Finally, some cautionary notes are in order. First of all, this Article
does not claim that constructivism should evenly apply to all IOs.56
Constructivism, in and of itself, is oriented to a “conditional, contextspecific” approach to investigating an IO.57 Thus, the Article duly
acknowledges that the new paradigm may not explain what is happening in
every single existing IO with the same level of contentment. In this sense,
the Article’s case study (WTO) might be vulnerable to the criticism of a
selection bias.58 Nor should the new paradigm be unduly construed as a
World Government or its equivalent along the lines of John Austin’s
command theory. Any international theory should always heed the fatal
risk of a false constitutional (domestic) analogy.59 Critically, an IO’s
community is not a logical evolution from a domestic constitution, but
rather a noble systematization of international relations themselves.60
I. THE CONVENTIONAL PARADIGM: A CONTRACT, TREATY AND
GESELLSCHAFT
A. Realism (Neorealism)
The end of the Second World War heralded an era of international
organizations (IOs). The unprecedented tragedy brought to nations a rare
Kantian moment of collective enlightenment.61 Most of about two hundred
international organizations now operating were established post-bellum.62
56

See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 20 (2008) (arguing that constructivism cannot serve as a “single framework” for
the study of international law due to the lack of a “model”).
57
Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 379–80.
58
See George Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996) (arguing against inferences based on compliance
rates of enacted treaties due to problems of selection bias).
59
Hedley Bull defined the “domestic analogy” as follows: “the conditions of an
orderly social life … are the same among states as they are within them: they require that
the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.” HEDLEY BULL,
HEDLEY BULL ON INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 79 (Kai Alderson & Andrew Hurrell eds.,
2000).
60
DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30, at 132 (arguing that international law and a domestic
state constitution cannot be understood in the same terms because international law
“presents an inverted image of the state and the constitution”).
61
WENDT, supra note 36, at 297–308 (describing the Kantian culture based on
collective identity and “friendship”).
62
For a comprehensive history of international organizations, see BOB REINALDA,
ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: FROM 1815 TO THE PRESENT
DAY (2009).
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Most conspicuously, the United Nations (UN) was created “to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “to unite our strength
to maintain international peace and security.”63 Many other IOs derived
from the UN, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), whose goal is
the “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.”64 On
the economic side, the so-called Bretton Woods institutions—the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—were launched to rehabilitate the war-torn
international financial, economic, and trade systems.65
From a technical standpoint, those IOs are a product of “treaties,”
such as the UN Charter, the WHO Constitution, and the IMF Articles of
Agreement. These treaties are multi-party contracts in which sovereign
states (contracting parties) stipulate their rights and obligations in a
collective attempt to achieve the putative various regulatory goals. Those
sovereign states negotiate terms of such contracts, draft, sign, and execute
them. In any private contract, contracting parties engage in various types of
“bargains” among themselves over eventual terms of those treaties during
the negotiation process. Naturally, they vie to secure better terms than their
fellow states.
This contractual characterization of treaties and IOs, which is
conventional under public international law,66 is susceptible to “realism”67
63

U.N. Charter pmbl.
WHO Constitution, art.1.
65
See Reinalda, supra note 62.
66
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Draft Articles of State Responsibility on
the Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10
(2001).
67
Richard Steinberg and Jonathan Zasloff categorized realism into three groups
roughly in accordance with its pedigree and theoretical development. Richard H. Steinberg
& Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 73–76
(2006). First, the “traditional realism” represented by Hans Morgenthau in the 1940s
viewed that international law was a “reflection of both the interests of powerful states and
norms held in common across states.” Id. at 73. Many scholars considered Morgenthau’s
emphasis on “power” as a positive (scientific) step in understanding international law since
it duly recognized the Westphalian reality largely lost in the American legal discourse in
the first half of the 20th century. Id. at 73–74. Yet some warned that such an approach
might be “morally wrong” in that it would rationalize the hegemonic (domestic) interest in
the name of international law. Id. at 74; see, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843 (2001). The traditional realism evolved on in the
latter half of the 20th century and reached its climax in the 1970s and 1980s during the
heyday of the Cold War. Here, the “power” element became so dominant that the
normative element still visible in Morgenthau’s classical realist theory evaporated.
64
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in IR theories. Realists basically regard an IO, despite its copious
variations, as an instrument that serves states’ functional needs, such as the
promotion of interstate cooperation and reductions in transaction costs in
interstate relations.68 Under the realist logic, an IO is nothing but a global
“Gesellschaft,” an artificial (“sterilized”) association that states establish for
the purpose of facilitating certain pre-programmed regulatory goals.69 An
Steinberg & Zasloff, at 74. Steinberg and Zasloff labeled this rather radical form of
realism, strongly influenced by political science literature, as “structural realism,” which is
synonymous with “neo-realism.” Structural realists employed a Hobbesian view of
anarchic state system, a submissive role of international law which they argued was a mere
“epiphenomenon of underlying power” or a “coincidence of state interests or coercion by
powerful states.” See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105
(1979); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983);
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–37, 118,
225 (2005). Interestingly, Steinberg and Zasloff observed that despite the “common
misunderstanding,” few realists make such claims other than structural realists. Steinberg
& Zasloff, at 75. Finally, Steinberg and Zasloff viewed that some realists acknowledge
certain “consequential” effects of international law on state behaviors, such as a facilitative
role of international law in interstate cooperation (“realist-institutionalist hybrid”). Id.
Nonetheless, even this eclectic position is not free from basic realist beliefs, such as the
belief that international law facilitates interstate cooperation to the extent that such
cooperation is useful to or favored by powerful states. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the
Shadow of Law or Power?: Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the
GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the
WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).
Therefore, it might be fair to say that most contemporary realists, both legal scholars and
political scientists, are “structural realists” or “neo-realists” in essence because even their
nuanced acknowledgement of institutional influence of international law (and international
organizations) still refuses to endorse a genuine “endogenous” impact of international law
to state behaviors. See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 112 (2009) (equating “structural realism” to “neorealism” as a “recent incarnation” of the classical realism). One way or another,
international law is still reduced to hegemonic interests of powerful states.
68
See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International
Organizations as Organizations, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 246 (1988); Harold K. Jacobson et al.,
National Entanglements in International Government Organizations, 80 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 134, 141–59 (1986). The most radical version of realism leads to a wholly dismissive
claim that “international law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their
interests.” GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 67, at 13. According to this position, states
comply with international law only when such compliance is in sync with their interests.
Harlan Grant Cohen, Can International Law Work?: A Constructivist Expansion, 27
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 636, 637 (2009) (observing that rational choice (game theory)
scholars view states as rational actors who condition their compliance with international
law on their interests).
69
See The Classic Statements, supra note 15, at 223–31 (viewing that where contracts
become the basis of a system, it is then formed by its interests).
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IO as a global Gesellschaft basically represents an “economistic” model
where states attempt to maximize their interests by using a rational
instrument to attain certain goals.70
While realism represents a rationalist understanding of an IO,71 the
IO’s innate contractual origin, and in particular, reciprocal bargain,
inevitably exposes the global Gesellschaft to power disparity among its
members. Powerful states tend to design IO norms (contracts) in a way that
best serve their own preferences and interests. Therefore, Gesellschaftian
norms are exogenously imposed constraints under which states’ alleged
rational behaviors are strategized.72 The realist paradigm dates back to the
Cold War period when “high politics,” such as security issues, dominated
both public policymaking and academic debates.73 The realist methodology
had nearly become a “tacit ontology,” 74 as it had long been left
unchallenged.
This rather inorganic view of IOs is a logical corollary to the root
thesis of realism, such as “theories about states”75 or “statist ontology.”76
Under this paradigm, an IO could not claim its own “ontological
independence”77 separate from states. Even an IO’s “causal status,” under
70

Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); Powell & DiMaggio, supra
note 28; Anna Grandori, Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency Constructs in the
Economics and Sociology of International Organizations, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES, 61–78 (Siegwart Lindenberg & Hein
Schreuder eds., 1993).
71
Realism is rationalistic in that it is based on Herbert Simon’s “substantive” notion of
rationality, which always generates an optimal behavior through objective calculations.
See Two Approaches, supra note 14 (citing Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics:
The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 294
(1985)). Yet as Robert Keohane aptly observed, this substantive rationality is situationspecific, depending on an initial analytical setting. Thus, the realist mantra of “national
interests,” which found its heyday in the Cold War era, tends to presuppose an ever-present
Hobbesian zero-sum conflict.
72
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 410–11 (1999) (observing that
ideologies of rationality determine strategic responses to law).
73
Katzenstein et al., supra note 51, at 652; cf. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE
WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2006) [hereinafter
Sovereignty] (characterizing the sovereignty-based old assumptions of public international
law as “mantras”).
74
John Gerard Ruggie & Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Epistemology, Ontology, and the
Study of International Regimes, in CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998); see also WENDT, supra note 36, at 35.
75
Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 70, at 706.
76
Id. at 700.
77
Id. at 704.
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which it may condition or structure state behaviors by controlling the
information-decision flow among states, might not grant the IO autonomy.78
According to the old paradigm, IOs “have no independent effect on state
behavior”79 since every single output generated by an IO is made, after all,
through and by states. Therefore, the old paradigm basically views an IO as
a passive instrument created by sovereign states for a specific function, such
as the reduction of transaction costs.80 At the same time, the old paradigm
betrays “reductionism” in that its focus on “intricacies of the interactions
among the individual actors” tends to make any organizational autonomy at
the collective level “certainly superfluous and probably deleterious.”81
Realism, based on “overly simplistic behavioural assumptions,”82
tends to bracket complex social interactions that lead to the formation of
preferences.83 Since realists tend to address only “one dimension of a
multidimensional reality,” it tends to “reif[y] contemporary political
arrangements.”84 However, states, as well as their actions, are in fact deeply
“embedded” in their socio-cultural setting beyond their control such that a
purely utilitarian (profit-maximizing) paradigm becomes nonsensical.85
Historical developments reflected in an IO’s institutional (normative)
design shape states’ behaviors, which are “culturally and structurally thick,
not just strategically lean.”86
Interestingly, this historicity has deprived the old paradigm of its
Zeitgeist status. Recent changes in both economic and cultural dynamics on
a global scale have provided strong propellants for a “gestalt shift” in how
we perceive and comprehend IOs.87 Although the Cold War era had
provided sovereigntists (realists) with a uniquely fertile ground to thrive, the
global market integration in tandem with the demise of political ideologies
have gravitated toward communitarian inter-dependence over sovereign independence. For example, it was no coincidence that in its youth, the WTO
78

Id.
John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L
SECURITY 5, 7 (1995).
80
See Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 390.
81
March & Olsen, supra note 17, at 735–36.
82
STEPHEN R. BELL, AUSTRALIA’S MONEY MANDARINS: THE RESERVE BANK AND THE
POLITICS OF MONEY (2004).
83
See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996).
84
Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 390–91.
85
See supra note 29.
86
See Ira Katznelson, The Doleful Dance of Politics and Policy: Can Historical
Institutionalism Make a Difference?, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 191 (1998).
87
DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30, at 161 (viewing that a gestalt shift depends on the
world society’s cultural and economic dynamics).
79
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was in its ascendency when the old realist paradigm emphasizing the theme
of power and security declined at the end of the Cold War.88 Thus, with the
advent of the new millennium, the prominence of the old (obstructionist)
absolute sovereignty,89 and its descriptive power, has begun to decline, if
not disappear entirely.90 This “postnational constellation,”91 which is
comprised of, inter alia, the end of the Cold War and the consequent
vanishing of the old realist security threat, pushed forward a new pattern of
thought, one that is “more ideational and holistic”92 than sovereignty-driven
confrontationalism. Under this new reality, while states still remain major
authoritarian entities whose collective actions distribute public goods and
manage global affairs, new transnational trends, such as global supply
chains, tend to deprive states of their “structural primacy and autonomy as
[] unitary actor[s] in the international system.”93
As collective stakes in the global public sphere—ranging from
international commerce to the war on terrorism—have grown, states’
perceptions toward IOs have begun to shift gradually from a functional tool
(contract) under which states compete with each other to something in
which they actually collaborate, partner, and participate (community). This
“mentalités collectives”94 tends to reconfigure the traditional Hobbesian
existential premise of states, i.e., anarchy, into a civilized status of
“membership” in an international community.95
In this situation,
overemphasizing state interests tends to generate an “incomplete”
understanding of IOs, which should be complemented by an alternative that
recognizes the “power of ideas.”96 In this context, Professor Joseph Weiler
88

Daniel Abebe, Future of the WTO (Daniel Abebe), THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LAW
SCHOOL
FACULTY
BLOG
(Feb.
23,
2009),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/future-of-wto.html.
89
Cf. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995); SUSAN
STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 14 (1996) (observing that there have been significant changes in the
international financial and political economies and noting that there has been a “diffusion
of authority away from national governments”).
90
See WENDT, supra note 36, at 4.
91
DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30.
92
WENDT, supra note 36, at 4.
93
Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49
INT’L ORG. 595, 625 (1995).
94
Territoriality, supra note 31.
95
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 89, at 27 (viewing that sovereignty has changed and
no longer means states have the freedom to act independently in their self-interest, but act
in membership in an international community).
96
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 347,
378 (1998). (Neo)liberalists have recently turned to “ideas” as “additional intervening
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insightfully observes that:
[T]he static nature of 20th Century hermeneutics has
camouflaged the development and differentiation of the international
legal system itself from an almost exclusively state-centric system
concerned primarily with mediating conflicting national interests
and ensuring mutual co-existence to a more complex system which
displays now communitarian features and is concerned with
common systemic values which at times may transcend or be
different from the negotiated aggregate of national interests.97
Another descriptive weakness of the old paradigm is its incapability
of identifying an institutional change within an IO—how it develops and
evolves internally over an extensive period of time. Under realism, change
is either simply “assumed away”98 or imposed externally upon an IO by
states as a logical outcome of their altered interests and preferences.99 Here,
change is no more than an exogenous re-creation by a state, not an
endogenous institutional development. In addition, “few have noted that
organizations differ over time, or that they perform differently from one
another, or that they achieve their ends with varying effectiveness or
efficiency.”100 Therefore, the old paradigm encounters few needs to
investigate a unique nature and property of any given IO.
Notably, certain normative deficiencies of the realist-Gesellschaftian
paradigm accompany the aforementioned descriptive ones. First of all, in
the Gesellschaftian structure, as is often the case in a domestic contract
situation, power determines the eventual terms of the contract.101 Naturally,
variable[s] between power/interest and outcomes.” WENDT, supra note 36, at 19.
Nonetheless, they still remain materialists in the sense that they do not accept the premise
that those material variables (power/interest) are in fact “effects” of or constituted by ideas.
Id. at 114, 378.
97
WEILER, supra note 53 (emphasis added); see also Andrew Emmerson,
Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Political Excuse?, 11 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 135, 150 (2008) (observing that the realist obsession with the status quo is
unsuitable to the WTO’s integrationist aspirations).
98
Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections between Historical and Rational
Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION
BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson &
Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005).
99
Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 661 (2006). Here, realists
show strong resistance to change, at least until the tipping point of what Krasner called
“punctuated equilibrium.” Krasner, supra note 67; see also Bell, supra note 25, at 12.
100
Ness & Brechin, supra note 68, at 247.
101
See Ji Li, From “See You in Court!” to “See You in Geneva!”: An Empirical Study
of the Role of Social Norms in International Trade Dispute Resolution, 32 YALE J. INT’L L.
485, 488 (2007) (observing that “realists predict that the WTO is nothing more than a
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the innate power disparity in the Gesellschaftian anarchy may entail
exploitation or other unjust outcomes. For example, even if a small WTO
member prevails over a big, powerful country (such as the U.S.) in a WTO
litigation, the former’s victory may be in vain. If the powerful country
refuses to comply with the WTO tribunal’s decision, the ultimate retaliation
by the small country, i.e., the suspension of a tariff concession, might not
work simply due to the insurmountable gap in the economic size between
the two countries.102 This frustrating prospect tends to deter small countries
from filing complaints against powerful countries in the first place.103 In
sum, paradoxically, the contractual nature of an IO is vulnerable to the very
Hobbesian struggle that it is supposed to prevent.
This power disparity among IO parties is also prone to an
“externalization” of domestic politics, in particular those of powerful
nations, onto the global Gesellschaft.104 In this process, the desperate
voices of powerless developing countries tend to be silenced.105 This
marginalization of developing countries within IOs raises various
developmental concerns.
Two interrelated, and disheartening,
contemporary global trends—the widening global income gap106 and everincreasing abject poverty in the least-developed countries (LDCs)107—have
forum for power politics”) (emphasis added).
102
“Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case which involves a
developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it
is not realistic or possible for it to implement the suspension authorized by the (Dispute
Settlement Understanding) for the full amount of the level of nullification and impairment
estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or under all agreements mentioned above
combined. The present text of the DSU does not offer a solution for such an eventuality.”
Decision by the Arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU, European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24,
2000), at ¶ 177 (emphasis added).
103
See Chad Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants,
Interested Parties and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 287–310 (2005). See
also Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The
Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (2005) (highlighting the
importance of capacity constraints in preventing poor countries from suing rich countries in
the WTO).
104
See Wendt, supra note 33, at 361; DAVID H. LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993); JUSTIN ROSENBERG, THE EMPIRE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: A
CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1994).
105
See Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 492 (2004).
106
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 7
(2005); INCOME: Global Gap Rising, World Bank Study Shows, UN WIRE (Jan. 18, 2002).
107
See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, ch. 2 (2005); Charlotte Denny, US
Blocks Brown-led Drive for Increase in Aid, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 23, 2002,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,3604,637808,00.html (last visited
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currently eclipsed a triumphant halo of globalization. As the World
Economic Forum (WEF) glorifies the mainstream consensus on market
opening and deregulation,108 the World Social Forum (WSF) accuses the
North of enacting hypocritical economic policies and explores the
possibility of “another world.”109 As discussed above, the realistGesellschaftian paradigm is largely incapable of accommodating a genuine
pro-development discourse within an IO, as its theoretical concerns remain
preoccupied with an egocentric state pursuing myopic national interests.
This development deficit that is destined to materialize under the global
Gesellschaft even invites those criticisms along the lines of neoimperialism. Some development scholars condemn the global Gesellschaft
as an “emerging Global State”110 or a new version of “Empire” operated by
a “global market and global circuits of production”111 without due
consideration of the interests of those marginalized.
Conceivably, those in the old paradigm camp might point to the
eventuality of “hegemonic unilateralism”112 or even certain merits of a
“well-meaning hegemon,”113 a role allegedly shouldered by the U.S. during
the Cold War era. For example, Kenneth Chan’s empirical analysis
illustrates the importance of “egalitarian” considerations in the outcome of
the GATT Tokyo Round trade negotiation.114 Chan argues that during the
Tokyo Round negotiation, which took place during the 1970s, the Swiss
proposal highlighting equity and fairness in tariff reductions prevailed over
the U.S.’ “efficiency” approach.115 Ethan Kapstein translated such
prevalence of egalitarianism in the Tokyo Round as a small “price” paid by
the U.S for having an open global economy.116 Considering the U.S.’
on Feb. 20, 2012) (reporting that 2.8 billion people on earth live on less than $2 a day).
108
See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, http://www.weforum.org (last visited Feb. 20,
2012).
109
See WORLD SOCIAL FORUM, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/wsf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2012). The WSF is “opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the
world by capital and any form of imperialism.” WORLD SOCIAL FORUM INDIA, Charter of
Principles, http://www.wsfindia.org/?q=node/3 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
110
B.S. Chimni, A Just World under Law: A View from the South, 22 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 199, 201 (2007).
111
MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE xi (2000).
112
DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30, at 183.
113
Id. at 116.
114
See Kenneth S. Chan, The International Negotiation Game: Some Evidence from
the Tokyo Round, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 456 (1985).
115
Id.
116
Ethan B. Kapstein, Power, Fairness, and the Global Economy, in POWER IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 80, 95 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
Regarding a similar observation that powerful nations bargain some constraints for the
long-term stability of the international society, see Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute:
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hegemonic status in the middle of the Cold War, this observation sounds
quite plausible. Yet after the Cold War ended and the post-hegemonic era
began, such strategic (hegemonic) egalitarianism declined in what Jagdish
Bhagwati termed the “diminished giant syndrome.”117 Unilateralist and
parochial trade politics have increasingly become a hallmark of U.S. trade
policy since the end of the Cold War.118
In sum, the old—realist-Gesellschaftian—paradigm tends to
generate certain descriptive discontents because its outmoded narratives
cannot fully analyze how the altered environment around an IO impacts its
structure in a manner driven by endogenous sociological dynamics within
the IO via cognitive factors such as ideas, culture, and norms. In addition,
the old paradigm, and its Gesellschaftian logic, are prone to the normatively
problematic consequences destined to entail from the inherent power
disparity among parties in an IO’s operation.
B. Regime Theory and Neoliberal Institutionalism
Many a scholar has attempted to overcome the aforementioned
limits in the realist-Gesellschaftian paradigm by exploring an alternative
one. Some realists departed from their traditional assumptions and took an
institutionalist turn. In the 1970s, an intellectual thirst for a systematic
explanation of global governance amid some uncharacteristic
developments, such as the relative encroachment of the U.S. hegemony and
the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
gravitated many scholars toward the “regime theory.”119 Regime theorists
define regimes as “governing arrangements constructed by states to
coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behavior
in various issue areas.”120 Therefore, a regime may constrain and condition
states’ behavior. In this regard, one can identify a “trade” regime
represented by the GATT/WTO and a “monetary” regime represented by
the IMF.
Yet the lingering deficiency in the regime theory is its failure to
Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the World Trade Organization, 35 L. &
SOC. INQ. 625, 633 (2010); Joel P. Trachtman, Embedding Mutual Recognition at the WTO,
14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 780 (2007); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act
through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (1998).
117
Jagdish Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant Syndrome: How Declinism Dives Trade
Policy, 72 FOR. AFF. 22 (1993).
118
Id.
119
Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of
the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT’L ORG. 753, 759 (1986).
120
Id.
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close the discrepancy between its epistemology and ontology.121 By
definition, regimes are based on certain epistemological traits, such as the
convergence of expectations or intersubjectivity among their participants.
Yet the realist-positivist pedigree in the regime theory tends to focus only
on objective forces influencing state behaviors and therefore trivializes the
subjective, and intersubjective, elements that produce meanings of their
behaviors and eventually constitute their identities (ontology).122 Therefore,
the role of norms is rather passive in the regime theory since the theory
regards norms as mere external variables with which to “hypothesize” a
certain incidence, such as a state behavior.123 Under this basically “causal”
setting, one of the classical logics, modus tollens, tends to prevail. In other
words, “even a single counterfactual occurrence” may lead to the refutation
of norms or their efficacy.124 For example, the IMF helps prevent its
members from manipulating their foreign exchange rates for the purpose of
obtaining undue trade advantage. Here, a regime theorist may be tempted
to equate an anecdote of currency manipulation with the normative
bankruptcy of the IMF.
Importantly, however, rather than directly “causing” a certain state
behavior, norms may “guide,” “inspire,” or “justify” the behavior.125 While
regime theorists are interested in whether an IO can effectively control its
members’ behavior, they seldom pay attention to the importance of the
“communicative dynamic” under which states justify their own behaviors as
well as interpret and respond to others’ behaviors through norms.126 In the
IMF example, regime theories would not focus on how other exporting
countries potentially affected by such an alleged currency manipulation
might demand reasons behind the measure from the devaluing country as
well as how the devaluing country might respond to such a reason-giving
request. Regime theorists might not fully embrace the possibility of the
devaluing country being persuaded and modifying its original measure as a
121

Id. at 764–66.
Sociologists criticize the titular objective tenets of rationality, such as market
efficiency or causality, as a “myth” in that they are not axiomatically correct but rather
widely “shared” and “accepted” in a community. See Edelman et al., supra note 72, at 410–
11; RICHARD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (2d
ed., 1987).
123
Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 119, at 766–68. One solution to this deficiency,
proposed by Kratochwil and Ruggie, might be to shift this positive epistemology embedded
in the regime theory to more “interpretive strains” accentuating discourses and
communication among state actors, as seen in Ernst Haas’ “evolutionary epistemology”
and Jürgen Habermas’ “universal pragmatics.” Id.
124
Id. at 767.
125
Id.
126
Id.
122
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result of this communication in a manner consistent with IMF norms.
Moreover, the regime theory, like realism, remains rationalistic in
that the role of norms is still instrumental: norms exist in a regime to serve
certain goals, such as reducing transaction costs.127 Yet such separation of
means and ends appears to be at odds with the nature of law itself. “In law
when available means limit and in part define the goals, the means and the
goal thus defined are to that extent inseparable.”128 On account of the
aforementioned deficiencies, even in its heyday (1980s) regime theory
literature failed to outshine that of general international relations.129
Therefore, scholars sought another alternative framework to understand IOs
against a broad backdrop of international relations. Liberalism (neoliberalism)130 might present itself as such an alternative framework.
Liberalism (neoliberalism) considers private individuals or their
groups as primary actors in international relations.131 It views states as
mere “surrogates” for individual or group preferences.132 These domestic
constituencies express their values and interests through various domestic
channels, such as legislation, political actions, court decisions, or selforganizations.133 As rational actors, neoliberalism argues, those individuals
“promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material
scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence.”134
127

See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J.
2599, 2624–25 (1997) (observing that regime theory explains cooperation in rationalistic
terms where compliance with international law resulted almost entirely from its functional
benefits).
128
Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 119, at 770 (quoting R.S. Summers, Naïve
Instrumentalism and the Law, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY (P.S. Hacker & J. Raz
eds., 1977)).
129
Id. at 761.
130
The prefix “neo” denotes a contemporary version of realism and liberalism
distinguished from their classical prototypes. Neo-realism and neo-liberalism employ the
“analytical tools of microeconomics to lend greater precision.” Finnemore & Sikkink,
supra note 7, at 890. In a similar manner, rational choice (game theory) theorists also
emphasize the scientific superiority of a rationalist methodology in studying international
law. See GUZMAN, supra note 56, at 17, 21 (praising a rational choice model as the most
promising model due to its parsimony and falsifiability). However, their subtle differences
are not material for the purpose of this article. Therefore, these two terminologies are used
interchangeably in this article.
131
While (neo) realists understand international relations as “simple behavioral
responses to the forces of physics that act on material objects from outside,” neoliberalism
recognizes certain cognitive factors, such as individuals’, albeit not states’, ideas and
beliefs, as a determinant for state behaviors. Adler, supra note 40, at 321.
132
Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the
Normative Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 681–83 (2001).
133
Id.
134
Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
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Therefore, neoliberalism takes an integrated view of the relationship
between the international and domestic spheres.135 For example, neoliberal
scholars believe that an understanding of the workings of international
tribunals requires knowledge of the internal operations of the state actors
that establish such tribunals and decide which disputes to submit or not to
submit.136
The challenge that liberal theorists face in international relations is
how to coordinate these different liberal preferences among states with
minimum transaction costs.137 Liberal theorists view that a regime or an
international organization provides such a coordination mechanism among
states by creating norms, reducing transaction costs, and supplying
information.
Accordingly, the stability of a regime indicates that
conflicting domestic liberal preferences have been somehow coordinated.138
For example, drawing largely on economics, such as game theory (the
prisoner’s dilemma), Robert Keohane demonstrates that “institutions”
matter since they can facilitate interstate cooperation by providing
information, reducing transaction costs, and monitoring compliance.139 In a
similar vein, Robert Axelrod observes that the prisoner’s dilemma could be
avoided if games were repeated indefinitely, the monitoring costs were
sufficiently low, and the actors’ discount rates (for the future) not too
high.140
Therefore, the neoliberal paradigm portrays an IO as a Lockean
architecture that denotes a cooperative rivalry among members to attain
International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 516 (1997).
135
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. 240, 241 (2000).
136
See Laurence Helfer & Karen Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its
Interlocutors: Understanding Preliminary Reference Patterns in the Andean Community,
41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 871 (2009) (arguing that European courts are more willing to
engage with the European Court of Justice because they are empowered by the relationship,
whereas Andean judges were passive).
137
Although neoliberalism offers richer narratives than neorealism, the variety, and the
complexity, of actors and their preferences tend to undermine its explanatory power of
causal relationship between those actors’ interests and state behavior. See Katzenstein et
al., supra note 51, at 658–59.
138
Andrew Moravcsik, supra note 134, at 537 (arguing that an international regime is
stable when groups adjust so as to make domestic policy socially embedded and its reversal
costly).
139
See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (viewing that international institutions facilitate
decentralized cooperation among state actors).
140
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 182 (1984) (noting the
importance of monitoring actual behavior so that players are able to observe and respond to
each other’s choices).
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certain common regulatory goals.141 Neoliberalism is similar to the regime
theory in that it highlights a regularized institutional mechanism with which
to monitor and coordinate states’ behaviors.142 According to neoliberalism,
such a coordinative mechanism is, as discussed above, largely a reflection
of member states’ domestic preferences. In other words, an IO’s members
project their domestic norms and values to the IO system.
Nonetheless, neoliberalism is also vulnerable to criticism, in
particular as to its key assumptions. One might argue that neoliberalism is a
rather special theory that applies only to a special situation, i.e., such a time
and space as meets “liberal” conditions. When and where such conditions
are met, neoliberalism may well describe why and how states cooperate and
change their behaviors. However, when and where such conditions are not
met, which in fact appears to be a norm in the contemporary international
environment, its theoretical persuasiveness and validity tend to be
questioned.
José Alvarez challenged a fundamental liberal assumption that
liberal nations are more likely to cooperate among themselves than nonliberal ones. Not only did Alvarez question the artificial distinction
between “liberal” and “non-liberal” states but also he pointed out the poor
record of the U. S., a liberal state, in international cooperation and
compliance.143 After all, according to one survey, 57 percent of WTO
memberships by population belong to the titular “non-liberal” group.144
Under this situation, over-projecting liberal political values embedded in
some Western democracies onto the WTO domain may result in both
descriptive and prescriptive conundrums.
C. The Rationalist Dilemma
The aforementioned conventional IR theories, be it neorealism or
neoliberalism, feature common properties as a form of rationalism. Even
141

See WENDT, supra note 36, 279–96 (explaining the Lockean anarchy in the
international relations based on cooperative rivalry).
142
Joseph Nye classified liberalism into three groups: (1) commercial Liberalism,
which focuses on the conciliatory role of international trade; (2) democratic Liberalism,
which spotlights the peace-making effects of republican government; and (3) regulatory
Liberalism, which captures the vitality of norms and institutions in regulating relations
between countries. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 40 WORLD POL.
235, 246 (1988) (quoting Robert O. Keohane, Economic Limits of Modern Politics:
International Liberalism Re-Considered, unpublished manuscript, 1986).
143
See José E. Alvarez, Behave Better: A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12
EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 202 (2001). He also emphasized that transjudicial communication
might not be exclusively reserved among liberal courts. Id. at 233.
144
Id. at 210.
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neoliberalism considers norms as a “superstructure built on a material
base.”145 Neoliberal scholars view that IO norms simply constrain or
“regulate” state behaviors in certain issue areas, rather than “constituting”
states’ interests and identities. They contend that those interests and
identities are exogenously defined by liberal domestic politics rather than
emerging endogenously within an IO.
Here, neoliberalism parallels neorealism in that material factors
exogenously determine state behaviors and provide us with useful
knowledge in understanding how international institutions work.146
According to David Baldwin,147 the theoretical distinction between
neorealists and neoliberals is far from being salient: any differences
between them are of a matter of degree, not of substance. For example,
both neorealists and neoliberals recognize that anarchy constrains state
behavior, while institutions (regimes) can mitigate such constraints. (No
wonder that the regime theory derives from neorealism, while neoliberal
institutionalism derives from neoliberalism.) What distinguishes neorealists
from neoliberals is that the former are more cognizant of anarchy’s
constraining power than the latter, while the latter are more optimistic on
institutions’ cooperation-inducing power than the former. Markedly, both
theories view that states desire to maximize their material interests, while
paying little attention to moral considerations. In this vein, Robert Keohane
grouped neorealism and neoliberalism together and labeled them as
“rationalism” in that their common thesis is substantive rationality
consisting of certain material utilities, such as power, interest, and
efficiency. The rationalist interpretation of an IO is as follows: Member
states create and maintain an IO because it serves the interest of powerful
members (neorealism) or to generate certain collective utilities, such as the
reduction of transaction costs, among like-minded (liberal) members
(neoliberalism).
Naturally, rationalism connotes a strong microeconomic bias148 as it
presupposes that international institutions are mediums that “rational, selfinterested actors” establish to “enhance efficiency in obtaining the actors’

145

Checkel, supra note 6, at 327.
See Two Approaches, supra note 14 (comparing the two approaches and their
respective strengths in analyzing how international institutions work and change).
147
See David Baldwin, Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics, in
NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 5–8 (David Baldwin
ed., 1993).
148
See Brunnée & Toope, supra note 36, at 32 (observing that proponents of
neorealism and neoliberalism “adopted the analytic tools of microeconomics to lend greater
precision”).
146
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preferences.”149 Thus, mainstream international relations (IR) theories
reveal their “enthusiasm for measurement”; in fact, both realism and
liberalism widely adopt microeconomic methodologies that are highly
susceptible to modeling and mathematical equations.150 In a similar vein,
John Ruggie highlights the “utilitarian” framework adopted by rationalism.
Ruggie critically observes that even rationalists consider ideational factors,
but in terms of utilities in achieving agents’ material interests.151 For
example, some scholars submit that rational actors may comply with
international law out of a fear of “reputation” costs.152 At first glance, one
might assume that a reputation seeker might easily internalize international
norms for fear of loss to its reputation from non-compliance. Yet it is still a
derivative form of rationalism in that reputation itself is an exogenous factor
shaping an actor’s rational pay-off matrices. If the fear of such loss is
somehow attenuated, as is often the case with superpowers like the U.S., it
is only rational to expect relatively little compliance from the actor, if not
always.153 More importantly, states may often comply with international
law without any rational (cost-benefit) basis.154
Although rationalism may be useful in understanding and predicting
IO members’ behaviors within a given matrix of preferences, it nonetheless
offers very few collective possibilities to “change” the existing system of
fixed preferences.155 Consequently, rationalism largely “reproduce[s] the
149

Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages—Historical Institutionalism and
Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 461, 474 (1998) (emphasis added); see also JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 22 (1989) (“Actions are valued and chosen not for themselves,
but as more or less efficient means to a further end.”).
150
See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 7, at 889–890. Cf. Robert W. Staiger, NonTariff Measures and the WTO, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-01, Jan. 2012,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201201_e.pdf. (adopting a
quantitative (mathematical) methodology in understanding non-tariff barriers under the
WTO system).
151
See Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 865–66 (observing that neorealists have
often imported unacknowledged ideational factors and that neoliberal institutionalism
“assigns a limited causal role to ideational factors”).
152
See GUZMAN, supra note 56, at 33 (arguing that reputation, along with reciprocity
and retaliation, are the three costs of non-compliance with international obligations).
153
In this context, the reputation model is vulnerable from its own rationalist camp.
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 67, at 102 (observing that the reputation discourse
tends to exaggerate the theoretical determinacy of reputation over state behaviors).
154
See Cohen, supra note 68, at 660–61 (arguing that states comply with the
prohibition of “torture” regardless of a cost-benefit analysis). Cf. Richard Warner, Does
Incommensurability Matter?: Incommensurability and Public Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1287 (1998).
155
See WENDT, supra note 36, at 377. Cf. Thelen and Steinmo, supra note 27, at 16
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status quo.”156 For this reason, the rationalist interpretation of an IO often
lacks historical and cultural insights with which one may identify the
transformation of the IO system on its own terms. As a type of
functionalism, rationalism tends to offer a “solution that is achieved
relatively rapidly and is independent of the details of historical events
leading to it.”157 It largely brackets the unique historical path of an
organization and its often rich institutional legacies, such as norms and
practices, thereby omitting the sociological reality of the organization.
Thus, it cannot explain how an IO has developed its own unique
institutional values and identity. Nor can it fathom how its norms, which
the system itself generates internally rather than accepting those imposed
externally, engineer the institutional evolution. For example, the rationalist
diagnosis of the current stalemate of the Doha Development Round is either
the lack of political input from powerful countries (neorealism) or the
failure to coordinate members’ domestic preferences (neoliberalism).
Rationalism simply would not take into account the ideational cause
(development) historically entrenched in the Doha Round.
Finally, as rationalism basically presupposes states as asocial,
atomistic, and “self-centered” entities,158 such an exclusivist dimension of
sovereignty tends to foreclose many necessary inquiries.159 As long as
sovereignty means “the ability to afford not to learn,”160 its mere invocation
may shrink future institutional possibilities, including various institutional
changes.161 Likewise, insofar as rationalism or Gesellschaftian theses
regard an international institution only as the “object of strategic choice,”
they fail to embrace the possibility that an IO may be a genuine—
(arguing that “a critical inadequacy of institutionalist analysis has been a tendency towards
mechanical, static accounts that largely bracket the issue of change and sometimes lapse
inadvertently into institutional determinism”).
156
WENDT, supra note 36, at 377.
157
March & Olsen, supra note 17, at 737–38.
158
Nichols, supra note 149, at 472 (quoting Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 336, 336
(1977) (“[t]he economic man is a social moron.”)); id. (also citing Mark Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481,
502–05 (1985) (critically observing that economic relations are in fact molded by sociocultural interests)).
159
See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 801 (2003) (observing that there are many criticisms of
sovereignty and that the IR system has to “reconsider certain sovereignty concepts”).
160
KARL W. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL 111 (1966).
161
WENDT, supra note 36, at 17 (criticizing realism’s incapability to explain
“structural change” under the logic of “plus ça change”).
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normative—constraint on actors’ behavior.162
II. A NEW PARADIGM: AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AS A
“COMMUNITY”
A. A Sociological Turn
The cardinal contribution of rationalism originates from its
characteristic parsimony enabled by its “thin” model of rationality defined
by “fixed preferences” and “neutral institutional incentive structures.”163
Based on such parsimony, rationalists can formulate mathematical game
models with hypothetical (rational) actors. Under rationalism, actors may
be rational yet “in an unthinking manner.”164 Nonetheless, these rational
actors are not necessarily real actors: they do not feature more complicated
(social) dimensions of their behaviors driven by non-material, i.e., cognitive
and ideational, factors such as ideas and beliefs.165 The rationalist
framework does not embrace the notion of “sentient agents” that can change
their institutions via “deliberation, contestation, as well as consensusbuilding around ideas.”166
At this juncture, it is vital to appreciate that these paradigmatic
shortcomings of rationalism derive not from its inherent flaws in the
theoretical design but from a largely inevitable epistemological
distinction.167 Rationalism basically denotes a “structural theory” in that its
main concern is to explain certain causal relations between the conditions of
action and action itself.168 Therefore, rationalism views that a state
behavior can be understood by, and attributable to, power (realism) or
domestic preferences (liberalism). In other words, according to a structural
theory given, exogenous conditions (structure) constitute “various modes of
162

Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of
International Institutions, 52 INT’L ORG. 729, 729 (1998) (arguing that institutions matter
as constraints that shape actors’ behavior in world politics).
163
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 5.
164
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 13.
165
See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 5; BO ROTHSTEIN, SOCIAL TRAPS AND THE PROBLEM
OF TRUST ch. 1 (2005); FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL ACTORS PLAY: ACTORCENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM IN POLICY RESEARCH (1997).
166
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 9.
167
See David Dessler, What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?, 43 INT’L ORG.
441, 448 (1989) (observing that an epistemological distinction between systemic and
reductionist theories corresponds with the ontological distinction between the arrangement
or structure of units in the international system and their interaction).
168
Id. at 444, 461.
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enablement and constraint” to state actions.169 Another epistemological
characteristic of structural theory is “reductionism.”170 Here, Kenneth
Waltz offered a classical definition of a structure. According to Waltz, a
structure refers to a “spontaneously generated, and unintended”
arrangement that is generated by individual units differentiated by their
properties or elements of domestic origin.171 In this structure, domestic
politics eventually externalize international outcomes.172
Such paradigmatic limitedness compels us to search for a novel
paradigm that departs from the aforementioned etymological assumptions
and instead embraces a “systems-level theory” that is capable of explaining
how the organization of units, rather than individual units themselves,
shapes their behaviors.173 The new paradigm should overcome the overdeterminacy of rationalism (structuralism) driven from an individuated
agency (state) structure defined by material factors, such as power, interests,
and utilities. Although these conventional IR theories hold analytical
prowess due to parsimony, they are nonetheless oblivious to certain
sociological phenomena, such as “intentional rule structures”174 that social
dynamics among agencies (states) create. Critically, it is not a mere
aggregate, or interrelationship, of states, but rather their corporate existence
or collectivity (community) that endogenously constructs those states’
perception of values, norms, and even their collective identities.175
While IR scholars have more recently begun to pay belated attention
to various social aspects of political life, their investigations have largely
failed to overcome the chronic “disciplinary isolation.”176 As IR scholars
face ever-mounting theoretical needs to reflect social constructions into
their own research programs, sociology offers a uniquely powerful set of
narratives on the role of culture and norms in international life that could
not be found in conventional IR theories such as realism and liberalism.177
169

Id.
Id. at 448.
171
WALTZ, supra note 67, at 18, 39–40, 60, 91.
172
Id. at 39, 60; see Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade
Liberalization, Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 219, 247 (2000)
(observing that a trade policy depends on the domestic power balance between pro-trade
and anti-trade groups).
173
Dessler, supra note 167, at 448.
174
Id. at 462.
175
Guy E. Swanson, An Organizational Analysis of Collectivities, 36 AM. SOC. REV.
607 (1971) (arguing that collectivities can be classified according to their organization’s
fundamentals for making decisions and taking action).
176
Finnemore, supra note 35, at 325.
177
Id. Notably, “sophisticated” versions of liberalism appear to converge with
constructivism. See Nye, supra note 142, at 238. Joseph Nye coined this strand of
170
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In particular, while conventional IR scholars (realists and liberals) tend to
abstract from historical changes universal principles that can apply
irrespective of time and space, a sociological paradigm “endogenizes” these
changes.178 In other words, it seeks to explore the very dynamics of these
changes themselves. In this regard, Martha Finnemore’s apt observation
merits a full reference:
Sociology’s institutionalism is thus radically different from
realism or liberalism in IR in that it falls on the structural or holist
side of the agent-structure debate. Analytically, social structure is
ontologically prior to and generative of agents. It creates actors; it
is not created by them. In contrast, most arguments in IR and
political science begin with agents. They take as given some set of
actors having a similarly pre-specified set of interests-states
pursuing wealth or security, members of Congress pursuing
reelection, firms pursuing profits, national leaders pursuing a place
in history. Macro-level social structure is explained as the
consequence of their interaction. Even in approaches that IR calls
“structural,” like Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism, the
international structure is an epiphenomenon of the power
capabilities of and interaction among individual actors; it has no
independent ontological status. It constrains only; it is not
generative.179
Against this background, political scientists have recently presented
various strands of institutionalism (“new institutionalism”) based on
different logics from rationalism.
While rationalism (or rationalist
institutionalism) represents a “logic of calculation,”180 “historical
liberalism as “sociological Liberalism,” which highlights the “transformative effect of
transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests.” Id.
at 246. The realist paradigm, which tends to reduce all “unexplained variance” to the unit
(state) level, cannot adequately theorize “nonstructural determinants” of state action, such
as the communicative ability, technological advancement, and international norms, which
go beyond the distribution of power among states. Id. at 250. In other words, neorealism
cannot fully explain the fact that the information technology and other logistical
revolutions may profit non-state actors and incentivize states to further open their markets
with no major changes in the international power distribution. Id. In contrast, liberalism—
at least some of its strands, such as sociological liberalism discussed above—pays more
attention to “non-power incentives and variations in the capacity to communicate and
cooperate.” Id.
178
Finnemore, supra note 35, at 327–28.
179
Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
180
Vivien Schmidt observes that in exceptional cases some rationalist scholars, such as
Judith Goldstein, do turn to the notion of ideas when they fail to explain institutional
change through interests only. For example, those scholars seem to view that ideas can
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institutionalism” and “sociological institutionalism” connote the “logic of
path-dependence” and the “logic of appropriateness,” respectively.181 First
of all, historical institutionalism focuses on a historical path-dependency of
an organization in its creation and evolution of an integrated system.182
While still recognizing a strategic (calculative) dimension of individual
actors’ dynamics in an organization, historical institutionalism also
highlights the “cultural” properties that an organization provides, such as
“moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action.”183 It provides
“background information” as to how social actors as “sentient agents” instill
past practices (and norms) with contextualized meanings, generate
knowledge, and respond to external challenges.184
In a similar fashion, sociological institutionalism highlights how
broadly defined institutions, such as norms, shape behaviors of states by
providing them with the “cognitive scripts, categories and models” that are
vital for those behaviors.185 According to sociological institutionalism, an
organization’s creation and evolution depends on social legitimacy, which it
generates in a certain cultural setting, rather than on a narrow utilitarian
premise.186 Thus, sociological institutionalism highlights the logic of
“appropriateness” based on the culture and values (“how reality is
structured”)187 in contrast with the logic of calculation or preferences
determine interests by clarifying goals in advance. Yet, they still fail to demonstrate why
some ideas are chosen over others. See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 4; see also JUDITH
GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY (1993).
181
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 1 (arguing that that historical institutionalism
concentrates on political institutions and their development through “regularized patterns
and routinized practices” subject to a “logic of path-dependence” and that sociological
institutionalism focuses on social agents who act based on a “logic of appropriateness”).
182
Nichols, supra note 149, at 475–82 (submitting that historical institutionalism’s
definitive characteristic is its attenuated path dependency, which places an emphasis on the
historical path taken by an institution in its creation and development).
183
See Hall & Taylor, supra note 83, at 939.
184
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 9 (viewing that the background information offered by a
historical institutionalist examination can illustrate how sentient actors instill rules with
contextualized meanings, construct understandings, or create ideas that “lead to the
‘layering’ of one institution over another, the ‘reinterpretation’ of an institution, or the
‘conversion’ of agents to another institution”).
185
See Hall & Taylor, supra note 83, at 948. “Sociological institutionalism (SI)
focuses on the forms and procedures of organizational life stemming from culturally
specific practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, scripts, and
meaning systems that guide human action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness.’”
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 10; see also W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS (1995); Powell & DiMaggio, supra note 28; JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN
P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATION BASIS OF POLITICS (1989).
186
See Nichols, supra note 149, at 485; Hall & Taylor, supra note 83, at 949.
187
WENDT, supra note 36, at 143.
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adopted by the law and economics approach.188 Yet some scholars who
pursue non-rationalist logics focus particularly on the “discursive”
dimension, such as ideas and discourse, and are often collectively dubbed
the “discursive institutionalism.”189 Among these scholars, some spotlight
the “ideas” side (e.g., “ideational turn,”190 “ideational institutionalism,”191
and “constructivist institutionalism”192); others emphasize the “discourse”
side (e.g., “discourse analysis”193 and “réferentiel” (frame of reference”194).
B. Constructivism
Premised on the aforementioned cognitive-sociological pedigree,
“constructivism”195 in the IR theory circle provides us with an insightful
paradigm. Constructivism emerged in the late 1980s as an “ideational
turn,”196 which aimed to counter materialistic theories such as neorealism
and neoliberalism.197 This new “style of reasoning”198 is a “move from the

188

See Nichols, supra note 149, at 498. “[E]ven though an individual may be acting
rationally or out of self interest, perceptions of rationality or self interest are framed
through—and thus shaped by—institutions.” Id. at 485; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death
of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
189
Schmidt, supra note 48, at 1–2; see also John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen,
Introduction, in THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 9–13
(John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen eds., 2001) (discussing discursive institutionalism).
190
See MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002) (discussing ideational
developments and transformations in institutional change).
191
See Colin Hay, The “Crisis” of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism in
Britain: An Ideational Institutionalist Approach, in THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 193, 193–218 (John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen eds., 2001).
192
See generally Colin Hay, Constructivist Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 56, 64–65 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006) (discussing
constructive institutionalism).
193
See Martin Hajer, A Frame in the Fields: Policymaking and the Reinvention of
Politics, in DELIBERATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THE
NETWORK SOCIETY 88–112 (Maarten A. Hajer & Hendrik Wagenaar eds., 2003).
194
Bruno Jobert, The Normative Frameworks of Public Policy, 37 POL. STUD. 376,
376-86 (1989).
195
See supra Part II.B.
196
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 7, at 888.
197
John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982) [hereinafter
International Regimes] (observing that the prevailing interpretation of international
authority, which focuses on power and a market rationality in international economic
regimes, ignores phenomenological dimensions such as social purpose).
198
IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 160 (2004).
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model of reality to the reality of the model.”199 In other words, the new
Zeitgeist calls for an “ontology” (“what kind of things there are and how
they are structured”) of an IO different from the old IR theories.200 In this
regard, a mere equilibrium of competing political vectors cannot fully
explain the existential foundation of an IO and its norms.201 While longterm benefits to states are “heavily discounted” under the short-term
election cycle in an average democratic system, the “value of obeying the
law” still counteracts such myopic calculation.202 Kenneth Abbott observes
that:
Economic and political structures are not corporeal things; they
owe their existence to constitutive ideas, constitutive in the sense of
defining or creating a social institution ... that would otherwise not
exist ... [This] is true of ... social constructs like ... international
regimes .... As the underlying ideas change, the norms, rules and
institutions that embody them, at all levels of political activity,
evolve along with them.203
Crucially, this new paradigm can explicate the nascent phenomenon
of community within an IO.204 While still regarding “states” as the main
units of analysis in explaining international relations, constructivism
differentiates itself from the traditional IR theories in that it focuses on
certain socio-cultural (“intersubjective”) dynamics among states in
understanding states’ behaviors. This is a “moment of perfect subjectivity”
in the social process that the rationalist model has largely bracketed, as it
naturalized its calculative methodology as ontology.205
Therefore,
199

Vincent Pouliot, “Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology, 51 INT’L
STUD. Q. 359, 363 (2007) (quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU, CHOSES DITES [THINGS SAID] 62
(1987)).
200
WENDT, supra note 36, at 22, 370–71; see also MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA
FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS
6–7 (2004) (observing that an international organization can create its own “social reality”
based on norms).
201
See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law
of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 501, 520 (1985).
202
Id. at 522.
203
Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996) (emphasis
added).
204
This paper focuses on a “legal” or “normative” community. An international
community, however, is not necessarily constituted by law alone. See Bruno Simma &
Andreas L. Paulus, The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of
Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 266, 267 (1998) (warning against any wholesale adoption
of “international legal community,” which views a community of states exclusively as a
community of international law).
205
WENDT, supra note 36, at 367–68 (observing that rationalism “isolates an important
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“endogenous” factors, such as ideas, values, and norms,206 are central
parameters to constructivism vis-à-vis “exogenous” factors such as power,
interest, or domestic politics.207
These endogenous factors concern “not merely the instrumental
rationality of the means actors select but also the normative selfunderstanding of the ends held by the social groups in question.”208
Therefore, constructivism can offer a richer, deeper, and perhaps better
explanation than realism as to why states “hang together,” as Gerard Ruggie
puts it, in particular through decades-long institutional changes, which are
beyond the disciplinary assumptions of the old paradigm.209 The normbased intersubjectivity tends to overcome the realist failure to envision
“critical self-reflection” which “gives us perspective on our social
environment and helps us to overcome any false sense of determinism.”210
This “collective reflexivity” offers an ideational foundation for a
community within an IO as a “public sphere” which is an “emerging space
where states appeal to public reason to hold each other accountable and
manage their joint affairs.”211
Constructivist understanding of an IO features the following basic
characteristics: the emergence of cognitive rationality, the formation of
social identities, and the redefinition of national interests.
First, the emergence of “cognitive rationality,”212 which is enabled
by a shared cultural-normative background within an IO, has naturally
transformed the tone of organizational discourse from being power-oriented
to being rule-oriented, and thus has paved the normative ground for an
emerging community within an IO.213 This is a “norm-governed”
moment in the social process, a moment of perfect subjectivity when actors choose actions
on the basis of identities and interests which are for an instant given”).
206
See Nichols, supra note 149, at 504; Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road
from GATT to MTO, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 41–42 (1994) (documenting how
Professor John Jackson’s study led to the creation of the WTO).
207
See supra Part I.A.
208
Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 860. See generally Max Weber, The Meaning
of “Ethical Neutrality” in Sociology and Economics, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds., 1949).
209
A rationalist behavioral change is “exogenous” in that a state responds only to
“changing prices in the environment.” WENDT, supra note 36, at 316.
210
Id. at 375.
211
Id. at 375–76.
212
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L. J. 273, 369 (1997) [hereinafter Supranational
Adjudication].
213
See Sovereignty, supra note 73. In his celebrated “communicative action” theory,
Jürgen Habermas argued that a communicative action necessitates a shared ground of both
norms and facts among social actors. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION
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change.214 In this sense, the biggest contribution of some IOs’ dispute
resolution systems and its derivative jurisprudence may be that it promotes
“fidelity to law,” rather than power, and unites state members around this
ideal.215 It is under such fidelity to law that states may learn to lose under
the dispute resolution mechanism based on their trust in the “lawimpregnated international community.”216 They cultivate an institutional
confidence that they can prevail in the future, even though they lose today,
as long as the community of law sustains. In the absence of the fidelity to
law, myopic parameters, such as political contingencies, would fill in any
legal vacuum.217 Therefore, an essential element of community of law is
the “self-awareness” by participants of the community of the “apolitical
context” of their operation.218
Second, in this new normatively conscious terrain, a collective
AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS (Ciaran
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 41; see also Emanuela

P. Cronin trans., 1993);
Ceva & Andrea Fracasso,
Seeking Mutual Understanding: A Discourse-Theoretical Analysis of the WTO Dispute
Settlement System, 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 457, 468 (2010) (arguing for a Habermasian
discourse-theoretical interpretation of the WTO Dispute Settlement System).
214
International Regimes, supra note 197, at 404–05.
215
Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Why Law – Efficiency, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW &
PHIL. 259, 275–81 (1994). “[T]he law of international trade requires that all of their
matters be dealt with in terms of principles, rather than naked animosity and power. Thus
international trade law encourages the continued communication essential for cooperation
among trading nation governments.” Abbott, supra note 201, at 532; see also WTO Panel
Report on United States-Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Jan.
27, 2000), ¶ 7.76 (“The security and predictability in question are of “the multilateral
trading system.” The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States
but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of security and
predictability affects mostly these individual operators…”) (emphasis added).
216
Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective
Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59 (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1995).
217
See generally Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as
a Practical Discourse, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?:
CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 67–68 (Padideh Ala’i et al. eds.,
2006) [hereinafter A New Agenda] (warning that a lack of discourse based on legal
principles creates a “fatal legal vacuum,” which tends to give rise to naked politics and
peace-breaking economic balkanization).
218
Supranational Adjudication, supra note 212, at 369; see also Vagts, supra note 67,
at 845 (observing that even a hegemon “has to operate in the highly legalized universe of
the World Trade Organization”). Regarding views that a legalized dispute settlement
system tends to reduce the role of bargains based on power, see Robert Keohane, Andrew
Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457 (2000). But see MAJA ZEHFUSS, CONSTRUCTIVISM IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE POLITICS OF REALITY 150 (2002) (emphasizing a
political nature of intersubjectivity that reflects underlying power dynamics among states).
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identity of states may be formulated against a social backdrop, rather than
in an egocentric, atomistic, and rational player image.219 Here, a social
identity may be defined as “sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself
while taking the perspective of others.”220
Importantly, this
intersubjectivity intermediated by ideas and norms is not reduced to an
individual, psychological level221: it is “collective intentionality” based on
social interactions.222 Based on social actors’ “ontological security,”223 this
social identity shapes their behaviors under given situations and thus
defines their collective interests.224 Therefore, under constructivism, how
the material world is shaped depends on “dynamic normative and epistemic
interpretations of the material world.”225 In other words, this social identity
is an essential element of members’ “lifeworld,” which might be defined as
the “storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens from which those
participating in communication draw agreed-upon patterns of interpretation
for use in their interpretive efforts.”226
A logical corollary of these social, collective identities is a strong
“empathy” among actors (states). A leading constructivist theorist,
Alexander Wendt, refers to this ethos as “positive identification with the
welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the
self, rather than independent.”227 That is to say actors build up not
particularized but “diffuse” reciprocity, which tends to discourage
uncooperative behaviors such as free-riding as well as assume costs even

219

“The resolutely positivist (…) approach of international law (…) has been replaced by
an objective conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to reflect a
collective juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of States organized as a
community.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 270-271 (July 8) (Declaration of President Bedjaoui, at ¶ 13).
220
Id.
221
See Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: An
Analytical Framework, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 3 (Judith Goldstein & Robert Keohane eds., 1993) (observing that
ideas, as well as material interests, shape behavior and noting the impact of beliefs shared
by large numbers of people, such as world views).
222
Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 869.
223
See Jennifer Mitzen, Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the
Security Dilemma, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 341 (2006).
224
See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State; 88
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384, 385 (1994).
225
Adler, supra note 40, at 322.
226
Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the
Nature of Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT’L ORG. 555, 564 (1997) (quoting JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 136 (1991)).
227
Wendt, supra note 224.
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without “selective incentives.”228 Such observation is not merely utopian
but empirically proven.229 Admittedly, the intersubjective qualities of social
identities are not necessarily cooperative; they can be “conflictual,” as was
seen in the Cold War.230 Nonetheless, this “intersubjective framework of
meaning”231 structures the “internationalization of political authority,”
whose elements include not only power but also legitimate “social
purposes.”232 Importantly, it is norms that bring to terms these sociological
behavioral patterns among actors.233 IO norms, such as institutional
practices and jurisprudence,234 share similar operational patterns with a
language in the sense that the structure of norms is basically self-referential.
A state member’s behavior “can be corrected by an appeal to its own
rules.”235 Moreover, these norms are “deeply embedded” and “taken for
228

Id. at 386.
See Linnda R. Caporael et al., Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of
Egoistic Incentives, 12 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 683 (1989); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical
Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI. 1669 (1989).
230
Wendt, supra note 224, at 386. In this sense, constructivist thinking has been
around ever since Karl Deutsch envisioned “security communities” in which social
interactions among members led to unique identity formation. See Brunnee & Toope,
supra note 36, at 26; Deutsch et al., supra note 36.
231
International Regimes, supra note 197, at 380.
232
Id. at 382. Ruggie’s use of the term “social purpose” seems ambivalent. On the
one hand, it seems to signify a domestic social purpose (such as smooth adjustment), which
inevitably compromises the goal of the multilateral trading system, i.e., free trade. On the
other hand, however, it also appears to indicate the GATT’s institutional purpose itself,
which tends to construct its institutional identity and states’ interest.
233
According to Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, a strong sociological tradition, in
particular Anthony Giddens’ “structuration theory,” shaped the development of
constructivism. Structurationists view that agents’ self-understandings of their behaviors
are inseparably linked to social structures and that agents and social structures constitute
each other via interaction. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 36, at 27; see also ANTHONY
GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION
281–84 (1984). Yet constructivists express a nuanced position in the causal relationship
between these ideational factors and state behaviors. They do not argue that shared
understandings (norms) nurtured by social structures are a direct cause of state actions:
rather, they observe that these social structures “constrain and enable” state actors in their
behavioral choices. Neo-Utilitarianism, supra note 46, at 869. “[S]tates follow specific
rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a longer-term interest in the maintenance
of law-impregnated international community.” Hurrell, supra note 216 (emphasis added).
This position parallels with Anthony Giddens’ thesis of the “duality of structure.”
GIDDENS, at 25–29.
234
See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005) (arguing that the age of IOs has given rise to international norms, which
alter the mechanisms behind the making, implementation, and enforcement of international
law).
235
Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 384.
229
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granted by participants as social facts that are not to be challenged.”236 In
other words, state members “proceed on the performative assumption that
speakers and hearers understand a grammatical expression in identical
ways.”237 In this sense, norms can be viewed more as a “rhetorical and
symbolic resource,” rather than as an “articulate mandate.”238 Therefore,
the sociological role of norms does not necessarily translate into a Humean
utility or a Hobbesian command. Rather, as Émile Durkheim observed,
norms prescribe a “claim to validity which is mediated by language and
which can be validated discursively.”239
Finally, the aforementioned cognitive-collective traits in
constructivism spotlight how national interests are molded in a broader
community of social actors (states) vis-à-vis the conventional IR theories
that simply treat national interests as something cast from outside and
fixed.240 These new possibilities connote the re-definition of the traditional
national interests in much longer and broader terms than the old paradigm
via a diffused notion of reciprocity. In this regard, national interests might
even signify systematic interests such as maintaining a stabilized, rulebased system.241 According to this new paradigm, the yardstick for an IO’s
success should be not only efficiency but also “appropriateness” reflecting
certain socio-cultural considerations.242 As Martha Finnemore observed,
organizations exist not solely because they are efficient but because as
social goods they are perceived to be legitimate.243 Thus, the new theory
also allows us to grapple with the “historical and cultural particularity” of
an IO qua independent entity.244
236

Id.
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 41, at 11.
238
Edelman et al., supra note 72, at 406–407 (arguing that “the content and meaning of
law is determined within the social field that it is designed to regulate”); see also Robin
Stryker, Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some Implications for Social
Conflict, Order, and Change, 99 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 847 (1994).
239
KRATOCHWIL, supra note 45, at 97.
240
International Regimes, supra note 197 at 384. In fact, this socio-idealist approach
is not new; it dates backs to postwar thinkers, such as Karl Deutch, Ernst Haas, and Hedley
Bull, as well as to much earlier ones, such as Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant. See
WENDT, supra note 36, at 3.
241
See Sovereignty, supra note 73, at 35–36 (criticizing a narrow version of selfinterest in international law based on rational choice theories).
242
See International Regimes, supra note 197, at 338; see also MARCH & OLSEN,
supra note 185 (arguing that a logic of appropriateness is fundamental to political action
and that legitimacy often depends on appropriateness).
243
Finnemore, supra note 35, at 329. She also argues that this is the “entry point for
culture” and that “the social values that support and legitimate some organizational forms
and not others, some social activities and not others, are cultural values.”
244
Reus-Smit, supra note 226, at 585.
237
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In sum, constructivism, as a new “generic orientation” or a new
“research project,”245 is capable of offering a complementary narrative to
pre-existing IR theories such as realism and liberalism. Constructivism can
demonstrate, via various empirical confirmations, its analytical capability
over modern developments of IOs.246 In the next chapter, this Article
applies constructivism in analyzing an institutional evolution of the
GATT/WTO.
III. APPLYING THE NEW PARADIGM: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS
A WORLD TRADE COMMUNITY
A. The Origin and the Nature of the WTO’s Gesellschaft
The archetype of the modern global trading system, i.e., the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was created against the backdrop
of a Hobbesian battle among trading nations in the interwar period. In a
desperate attempt to escape the quagmires of the Great Depression at the
expense of its trading partners, the U.S. under the Hoover administration
commissioned one of the most egregious incarnations of protectionism in
history, the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.247 This ill-conceived prescription
evoked spontaneous retaliations from its trading partners. This dismal
phenomenon was quite a realist manifestation in that every country
attempted to safeguard its own (myopic) national interest at the sacrifice of
others. At the same time, it demonstrated a Gesellschaftian symptom in that
those trading nations had totally failed to take into account their collective
interests, let alone those of others. The consequent economic balkanization
soon wreaked havoc on the global trading system, reducing the world trade
volume by seventy percent and eventually contributing to the outbreak of
the Second World War.248
245

Susan K. Sell & Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: the Contest between
Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 143, 145
(2004) (quoting Mayer N. Zald, Culture, Ideology, and Cultural Framing, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 262 (1996) (defining a “frame” as
“specific metaphors, symbolic representations and cognitive clues used to render or cast
behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of actions”)).
246
Katzenstein et al., supra note 51 at 647–48 (viewing that research was generally
more empirically oriented when analyzing social forces and political institutions).
247
See Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT’L
ORG. 179, 187 (1988) (observing that the failure of the Smoot-Hawley Act to deal with
economic decline led to the delegitimization of protectionism and created a policymaking
crisis).
248
See Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization:
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This bitter experience brought to trading nations a rare Kantian
moment of collective enlightenment.249 Bonding trading nations with a
dense web of trade relations would be an effective way to prevent another
tragic war.250 The GATT’s framers realized that they should promote open
trade to achieve the Kantian aspiration of peace via collective prosperity,251
i.e., “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand.”252
This Kantian aspiration notwithstanding, the GATT framers had no
option but to create a contract (Gesellschaftian), not a community
(Gemeinschaftian), in its inception: there had been neither a strong ethos of
community among trading nations nor an adequate legal infrastructure to
buttress the original lofty cause. Neither vibrant trade nor collective trust
had existed among them. Under these circumstances, the most important
mission was to promptly resuscitate anemic international trade and staunch
any further protectionism, i.e., the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade” and the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce.”253
Against this background, the GATT had started as a conventional
contractual entity that sovereign contracting parties established for the
purpose of administering trade liberalization, in particular tariff reduction,
and monitoring any cheating (protectionism) among contracting parties.
The gist of this contract was to conduct reciprocal tariff reduction bargains
and preserve their outcomes (tariff concessions) via legally binding
obligations. The GATT contract condemned and remedied any cheating
that would counterbalance the delicate balance of concessions attained by
previous tariff-cutting negotiations. As a contract, the GATT, and now the
WTO that inherited the GATT’s contractual legacy, naturally preserves the

Lessons from the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds.,
2003) (quoting remarks by the former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on
the U.S. trade policy and the WTO on Mar. 2, 2000).
249
See supra note 61.
250
See A New Agenda, supra note 217, at 66 (observing that the cost of disputes
increases when trading nations become tightly interlocked with one another).
251
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHIC ESSAY 33 (Benjamin F.
Trueblood trans., 1795) (“it is necessary that all together, expressing the collective unity of
their united will, should determine to bring about this condition… The society of citizens
must act as a whole. Above the diversity of the particular wills of all a uniting cause must
intervene.”).
252
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
253
Id.
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sanctity of “bargains” based on the quid pro quo principle.254
Thus, the GATT’s original function was to cut tariffs, as was seen in
its very appellation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Beware
that the word “Tariffs” comes before “Trade.” Cutting tariffs was the
quintessential material goal of a grand contract titled GATT: material,
tangible term “Tariffs” were prioritized over cognitive, intangible term
“Trade.” Tariff reduction is mainly a “bilateral” negotiation process,255
which is run by a reciprocal bargain and culminates in a balance of mutual
concessions, although benefits of these bilateral bargains are eventually
multilateralized. Under this quid pro quo structure, power and interest are
the main currencies and languages of discourse; there is little room for
cognitive factors such as norms and values. Note that trade rules, such as
the National Treatment principle, were originally designed to play only a
secondary role of preserving the original balance of reciprocal concessions
in trade negotiations, not for the sake of rule of law in trade relations
itself.256
An earlier pattern of GATT jurisprudence attests to this contractual
aspect.
For example, the remedial prototype of the GATT was
“nullification or impairment,”257 which is equivalent to injuries or damages
in the domestic law of contract. Once a contracting party inflicted any
commercial loss (nullification or impairment) on another contracting party,
the former was deemed to have undermined the subtle material balance of
concessions made in the previous negotiation and thus liable to the latter,258
regardless of whether the measure at issue conflicted with GATT
provisions.259 Therefore, early GATT panels often explored whether and
254

See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 763, 766–67 (2004) (observing that GATT was mainly a reciprocal tariff
reduction mechanism among contracting parties that was meant to preserve the “delicate
balance of tariff concessions” or interests that “parties had labored to establish”).
255
See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 549 (2001) (arguing that most WTO treaty provisions
can be reduced to bilateral state-to-state relationships); but see Chios Carmody, A Theory of
WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 527 (2008) (contending that the WTO is based on a
framework of collective obligations and individual rights, which promotes interdependence
over time); Sungjoon Cho, WTO’s Identity Crisis, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 298 (2006) (book
review) (observing that Pauwelyn “sacrifice[s] the autonomy of the WTO system,” which
has its own norms).
256
See Sungjoon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They
the Achilles’ Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 311 (1998).
257
GATT, supra note 253, at art. XXIII.
258
See generally Cho, supra note 257 (discussing the multilateral trading system
(GATT/WTO)’s institutional evolution from a negotiated contract to a legalized regime).
259
Since the contractual nature of GATT 1947 prioritized attached contracting parties’
original expectations on the balance of concessions struck in the tariff negotiation over any
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how much a defendant’s measure caused actual adverse commercial effects,
such as the loss of exports, to the complainant.260
B. The WTO’s Gesellschaftian Legacy and Its Descriptive Discontent
Like any other social construct, the old paradigm (realism-global
Gesellschaft), discussed above reflects a particular social context of its time.
Such context may be both ideological and material (economic).
Importantly, as its original underlying social context changes, the old
paradigm tends to lose its original traction as an analytical tool. In addition
to these external contextual changes, the unprecedented institutionalsociological evolution within the GATT/WTO over the last six decades has
transformed its internal dynamics, which is characterized by its unique
norms and culture in a manner unfathomable under the old paradigm.
First, from an ideological standpoint, the old GATT had operated
under the dominant milieu of the East-West conflict. The GATT largely
excluded the former Soviet bloc as well as Communist China during the
Cold War era. This exclusion might have disqualified the GATT as a
genuine “global” trading system. Yet the sudden dissolution of the Soviet
bloc and the rise of China as a major trading power during the last two
decades have eloquently demonstrated the ever-intensifying trend of
globalization-cum-interdependence. This sea change tends to invite more
open, integrationist thoughts than ever, free from rigid statist, sovereigntydriven patterns of thought.
From an economic perspective, the Lockean architecture—
cooperative rivalry—embedded in the GATT prototype was based largely
on the nineteenth-century mercantilist reciprocity. The classic production
paradigm, under which any product would be harvested or manufactured
legal breach of GATT norms, GATT framers provided atypical remedies for those
situations in which such expectations were unduly denied, i.e., when their potential benefits
were nullified or impaired, even in the absence of any specific violation. GATT Article
XXIII:1 (b) provides this special cause of action, labeled “non-violation” claims, which the
WTO DSU also endorses. See generally Cho, supra note 257 (discussing and critiquing
non-violation provisions of GATT/WTO dispute settlement system).
260
See e.g., Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23,
1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, ¶ 17, 20 (1959) [WTO Doc. Symbol BISD/75/60].
In this early GATT case, the panel, after observing that the Italian measures violated GATT
Article III (National Treatment), engaged in quite a thorough analysis as to “whether the
operation of Law No. 949 had caused injury to United Kingdom commercial interests, and
whether such an injury represented an impairment of the benefits accruing to the United
Kingdom under the General Agreement.” Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). The panel eventually
recommended that Italy should remove the “adverse effects” which Law No. 949 had
caused to the UK. Id. ¶ 20.
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entirely in one country (“mono-location”),261 led naturally to a “produceroriented” trade policy.262 In turn, this producer-oriented trade policy
nurtured a mercantilist myth that export would be a virtue and import a
vice. A historically etched image of a sovereign country’s power and its
national interest envisioned a mercantilist country amassing national wealth
(foreign currencies) by promoting exports and discouraging imports.
Imports, as concessions, were deemed mostly as prices paid for better
market access. In this situation, domestic producers are well positioned to
lobby and capture their governments since their commercial interests are
concentrated in this single-sourcing structure. Thus, competition between
domestic and foreign producers easily translated into competition between
states that endeavor to maximize their net exports (exports minus imports).
This mercantilist structure explains a conventional trade negotiation model,
i.e., reciprocity, under which each trading nation acquires market access
(export) from its trading partner only by offering corresponding concessions
(import) to the latter. According to this paradigm, the GATT/WTO, as a
global Gesellschaft, exists to coordinate such reciprocal bargains whose
ultimate purpose is to augment these material (commercial) values, which
are equated with the titular “national interests.”
More recently, however, technological innovations, in particular in
the areas of transportation and telecommunication, have allowed businesses
to pursue “trans”-national wealth and prosperity, challenging the sacrosanct
notion of territoriality.263 A revolution in manufacturing patterns, such as
“global supply chains,” has seriously diminished the territorial closure in
international trade, which was once a hallmark of sovereignty (“multilocation”).264 Under this sophisticated web of global sourcing networks,
once parochially defined domestic trade interests have now expanded to
every niche throughout the world.265 “The distinction between what is and
what is not American or Finnish or Chinese has been blurred by foreign
direct investment, cross-ownership, equity tie-ins, and transnational supply
chains.”266
In other words, made-in-China does not necessarily mean that every
step of production would be conducted in China, as a recent study on the
261

See
Made
in
the
World,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
262
See Sovereignty, supra note 73, at 237–38.
263
See Territoriality, supra note 31.
264
See supra note 262.
265
Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth: How Global Economic Integration Renders Trade
Policy Obsolete, 42 CATO INSTITUTE TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2009).
266
Id.
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iPod manufacturing powerfully demonstrates.267 Thanks to logistical
innovations, a footloose manufacturer can now outsource multiple
intermediate production stages to multiple countries. Moreover, those
factories manufacturing made-in-China products may even be owned by
non-Chinese (foreign) investors.268 The old obsession with a “national
origin” has increasingly become trifling in this new era of global
sourcing.269 After all, these expanded trade opportunities tend to make the
old mercantilist Gesellschaftian model anachronistic and force us to pierce
the veil of a state so as to better observe what is really happening
underneath. Ranging from a T-shirt to an iPod, these “made in the
world”270 products involve multiple economic players—both manufacturers
and service providers—from multiple countries. Here, more states and
individual economic players can benefit from global commerce than the
traditional mono-location model. This multi-origin manufacturing structure
tends to dilute the aforementioned obsession with mercantilist national
interests. Instead, these diversified and diffused configurations of trading
nations (and traders) tend to care more about stability at the systematic level
that secures their footloose transnational business activities than predetermined commercial rents. Thus, the prevailing concept of trade has
shifted from a “zero-sum” (mercantilist) or us versus them image to that of
“positive-sum” or us and them. Here, trading nations have become partners
rather than rivals.271 The old paradigm cannot fully capture this new trade
reality.
Equally importantly, while the old paradigm’s realistGesellschaftian legacy is undeniably at large, the institutional development
of GATT/WTO for the last six decades has nonetheless revealed the
burgeoning non-material (ideational and cognitive) elements in constructing
the GATT/WTO.272 It is within this altered context in which constructivism
can offer an appropriate tool to expound a norm-oriented evolution in the
267

Hal R. Varian, An iPod Has Global Value. Ask the (Many) Countries That Make It,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2007.
268
Even as economic growth in China has reportedly slowed, 2011 was a recordbreaking year with $103.8 billion in foreign direct investments in China. See Aileen Wang
& Koh Gui Qing, Foreign Investment in China Down First Time in 28 Months, REUTERS,
Dec. 15, 2011.
269
Sovereignty, supra note 73, at 11.
270
See Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, Speech to French Senate (Oct. 15, 2010),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl174_e.htm.
271
See James Rice & Matthew Waller, How to Make “Made in China” Less Alarming,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at 9.
272
See Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie
and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 81, 85 (2006).
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operational governance of the world trading system.273 This new pattern of
perceiving the WTO holds vital potential for its reconstruction because a
new ontology of the world trading system—a community (Gemeinschaft) of
law—based on the new way of thinking tends to generate new social
realities around the WTO.
From the “political bargain” perspective, the validity, which may be
gauged by efficiency, of certain provisions would not matter much if they
were bargained for other provisions in different issue areas.274 What is vital
in a global Gesellschaft is that it maintains an overall balance of quid pro
quo across issue areas. The negotiation style, i.e., single-undertaking,
reflects this cross-bargaining. Subsequently, however, discourses on those
rules develop in various discursive forums, such as the committee meetings
or WTO dispute settlement proceedings. These discourses transpire not
necessarily within the context of an original political bargaining but more
likely transpire against the teleological backdrop of the WTO legal system.
In fact, this critical mismatch between Gesellschaftian positions from
certain (powerful) members and Gemeinschaftian interpretations of the
WTO often generates tensions.275
Decades of institutional evolution under the GATT had begun to
form a new legal dynamic.276 As the former Director of the WTO Appellate
Body Secretariat Debra Steger observed, the GATT slowly evolved into
“something greater than a contract that could be withdrawn from by any
contracting party whenever it found the obligations too onerous.”277
Naturally, the material element of “nullification or impairment” was
fossilized as it was simply presumed whenever a panel detected a
“violation,” which as a cognitive-normative element became more
273

See supra note 36.
Robert Howse, Do the World Trade Organization Disciplines on Domestic
Subsidies Make Sense?: The Case for Legalizing Some Subsidies, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 85 (Kyle W. Bagwell et al. eds.,
2010) (submitting that a political bargain perspective of the WTO views legal constraints
on subsidies as a desirable cost of a bargain that curbs CVDS [countervailing duties] used
against subsidies).
275
See Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 621
(2010) (contrasting the US’ sovereignty-maximizing interpretation of its zeroing practice
with the majority of WTO members’ institution-preserving construction of the same
practice).
276
John Gerard Ruggie describes this as “communicative dynamics.” NeoUtilitarianism, supra note 46, at 868; see also PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE:
STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 134 (1987) (defining discourse
as a historical “unit of meaning”).
277
Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and …” Conundrum—A Commentary, 96
AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 (2002).
274
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important to the community of law than its material consequences, i.e.,
nullification or impairment, such as the decrease of export.278 In fact, any
violation would ipso facto constitute a nullification or impairment.279
Overall, a successful institutionalization, in particular the juridicalization, of
GATT, as represented by its well-operating dispute settlement mechanism,
attests to the emerging presence of certain endogenous factors, such as
shared norms, which would construct member states’ behaviors and
identities.
In sum, both external changes in the global trade environment and
institutional transformations of the internal dynamics among trading nations
as social actors tend to weaken the diagnostic force of the old realistGesellschaftian paradigm within the WTO system.
C. The WTO’s Gesellschaftian Legacy and Its Normative Discontent
In addition to the incomplete description of the new trade
environment as well as internal institutional evolution, the old paradigm,
when it functions as a modus operandi for state behavior, is also vulnerable
to “normative” dilemmas. For example, a narrow functionalist agenda, such
as trade liberalization, enshrined in the original GATT contract could not
fully address an enhanced goal of the newly created WTO, i.e., an
“integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.” Only
shared ideas and perceptions among WTO members can embrace such
integration that often requires the reconciliation between trade and nontrade values.280 Integration is a serious normative project that requires
socio-cultural dynamics beyond contractual inputs.
First of all, the contractual (Gesellschaftian) nature of the
GATT/WTO is naturally prone to positive narratives of “power” and
“economics,”281 as is often the case in a private contract.282 For example,
278

Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [WTO Doc.
Symbol L/4907].
279
See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Jan. 17,
1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, §§ 5.1.3–5.1.12 (1988) [WTO Doc. Symbol
L/6175].
280
See Thomas Cottier, Limits to International Trade: The Constitutional Challenge,
94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 220, 221 (2000) (observing that trade liberalization
“inherently starts to require, rely upon and develop positive integration, i.e., it depends on
common and shared standards and perceptions”).
281
While classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, did pay attention to normative
factors, such as international law, which could restrain the exercise of power, the “turn”
away from norms resulted from the wide adoption of an economic approach among
political scientists in the late 1970s and 1980s. Obsessed with the propensity for

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

48

Reconstructing World Politics

[24-Feb-12

Richard Steinberg observes that powerful WTO members, such as the U.S.
and the EU, can wield a unilateral veto power in the selection of the WTO
Appellate Body members and even refuse to comply with its decisions that
are unpleasant for domestic political reasons.283 From an economic
standpoint, Alan Sykes applies a private contract model to the WTO
remedies and advocates an “efficient breach” thesis. Sykes contends that
paying damages via compensation or suspension of concessions should be
“an option for WTO Members” and that it is “both understandable and
desirable” “as a matter of economic logic.”284 According to his economic
logic, powerful (and wealthy) WTO members might be tempted to buy out
their violations with impunity.285 Powerful members will maintain a global
Gesellschaft so long as the benefits from reciprocal bargains (such as trade
negotiations) exceed the costs of administration (such as the monitoring and
enforcement of cheating (protectionism)). Importantly, the power disparity
within the global Gesellschaft inevitably accords powerful members a
variety of advantages, such as more “bargaining space.”286
The realist-Gesellschaftian paradigm’s other normative deficiency is
that it is inherently vulnerable to capture: domestic politics, engineered by
interest groups, shape287 or constrain288 trade policies. Naturally, the old
“measurement,” both realist and liberal scholars wanted to demonstrate, in an aura of
scientific alacrity, that states pursue the maximization of “utilities” and that a coordinated
“game” toward cooperation is possible even among these egocentric state actors. See
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 7, at 889–90.
282
See e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Power, Contract, and the Economic Model, 14 J. ECON.
ISSUES 909 (1980) (observing that there are two categories of power in contract and
economics).
283
See Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking, supra note 67, at 249 (contending that political
constraints are difficult when powerful WTO members each have unilateral veto powers
over Appellate Body member selections and can defy domestically unpopular political
decisions by refusing to comply).
284
Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347, 347 (Marco
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
285
Id.; see also Cho, supra note 257.
286
See Two Approaches, supra note 14, at 387.
287
Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How it Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–21
(2010) (arguing that strong lobbies from developed countries’ domestic interest groups,
such as big pharmaceutical companies, pushed forth the launch of the TRIPS Agreement in
the Uruguay Round).
288
See Timothy J. McKeown, Firms and Tariff Regime Change: Explaining the
Demand for Protection, 36 WORLD POL. 215, 216 (1984) (observing that the civil society’s
demands put constraints on the government’s tariff policies since ignoring such demands
incur high political costs in the competitive political system).

PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE OR QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

24-Feb-12]

Reconstructing World Politics

49

paradigm preserves protectionism and mercantilism,289 which is
symptomatic of the normative encroachment of the GATT/WTO system.
This dyad of protectionism and mercantilism has in fact become a trade
ontology itself. Based on the realist structure,290 modern trade policies are
based on a parochial assumption that exports are good and imports are
bad.291 In the global Gesellschaft, the parochial domestic politics of
powerful trading nations directly control trade negotiations. Captured
domestic governments, which are largely unresponsive to the general public
(both domestic and global) welfare gains from open markets, repeat the
same old protectionism seen in the interwar era.292 For example, powerful
domestic lobby groups, such as the American Farm Bureau and the National
Association of Manufacturers, tailgated the U.S. negotiators all the way to
Geneva not only to monitor the negotiation but also to give instructions to
negotiators.293 It is this die-hard mercantilist bargaining driven by a myopic
obsession with exports as utilities and imports as disutilities which has
deadlocked the Doha Round negotiation for the past decade.
Consider why the Doha Round failed. Interestingly, the old and the
new paradigms tend to present two starkly different diagnoses and
prescriptions over the aforementioned recent Doha debacle. Under the old
(rationalist) paradigm, as some WTO members argue, the debacle is yet
another failed deal due to the failure of negotiators to discover a balanced
289

ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1975) (arguing that the U.S. needs
a trade-dominated mercantilist strategy and should impose selective controls and taxation).
290
The Realists basically adopt the Hobbesian assumption that the international system
represents a perpetual struggle between the “Self” and the “Other.” See McKeown, supra
note 289, at 216.
291
See Ikenson, supra note 266 (observing that trade statistics are misleading or even
meaningless due to the proliferation of transnational supply chains and that exports are no
longer an appropriate indicator of competitiveness).
292
Id. at 10 (“Mercantilist negotiating strategies or trade barriers may temporarily
benefit some producers, but they invariably hurt consumers, wholesalers, retailers,
importers, truck drivers, warehouse operators, designers, engineers, accountants, marketers,
financiers, and globally integrated producers who rely on imports and who have great
stakes in an open world economy”).
293
Of course, the South itself may not be free from the accusation of mercantilism.
Developing countries are also eager to protect their own champion industries by means of
tariffs and other trade barriers. Although some protection, such as certain agricultural
protection for the food security or rural livelihood concern, may be justified, others, such as
high industrial tariffs, may not. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall
of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution,
7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2004); Jagdish Bhagwati, Wanted: Jubilee 2010 (Dismantling
Protection),
June
26,
2002,
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/713/Wanted:_Jubilee_2010.html.
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bargain.294 Yet, the old paradigm is oblivious to the fact that the Doha
Round was meant to be a “development” round. While powerful members’
externalization of domestic interests may appear natural from a
Gesellschaftian standpoint, it hardly addresses the solemn consequence that
the Doha failure takes an enormous toll on the world’s poor.295 Ominously,
the recent financial crisis only highlights this normative deficiency of the
old paradigm, as the Gesellschaftian struggle might precipitate an entropic
vision of the world.296
More generally, protectionism is nothing but a “constitutional
failure” in that special interests (factions) prevail over the general public
welfare.297 These “normatively unfiltered interest positions” simply exploit
law in according themselves the semblance of legitimacy.298 For example,
the current U.S. Farm Bill continues to shower a lavish sum of federal
subsidies mostly to rich corporate agro-businesses.299 At this juncture, one
might recall that James Madison passionately warned against such special
interests (“factions”) in the Federalist Papers.300
Moreover, the old paradigm is largely ill-equipped to address new
types of trade restrictions such as “non-tariff barriers” (NTBs). After
rounds of trade talks, conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas,
were dismantled dramatically. In contrast, domestic regulations have begun
to emerge as new trade barriers (NTBs) that rapidly replace tariffs and
quotas.301 Concomitantly, as the era of the welfare state dawned, modern
governments began to multiply domestic regulations in response to novel
regulatory demands in such areas as the environment and human health.
Left largely uncoordinated, these diverging domestic regulations themselves
function as trade barriers even without protectionist intent.302 Of course,
these domestic regulations, shrouded in legitimate social policies, often
294

Cho, supra note 2.
Id.
296
See Gideon Rachman, Welcome to a Zero-Sum World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2010.
297
Robert E. Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign Trade
Policies, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 503, 503–8
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (discussing Jan Tumlir’s critique of
protectionism as “constitutional failure”).
298
See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 41, at 40.
299
See Thomas Gift, Big Government of the Most Imprudent Kind, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH (Virginia), Sept. 2, 2007.
300
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
301
See Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy
Transparency, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 371 (2006) (viewing that democracy reduces
incentives to employ tariffs while increasing incentives to employ less transparent NTBs).
302
See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A
REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003).
295
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cater to protectionist needs.303 Hard to measure, these administrative
barriers cannot be simply bargained away. Instead, they should be talked
away.
This is a serious challenge to the WTO qua institution. Whether, or
how far, should a trade organization tolerate non-protectionist, yet still
trade-restrictive, measures? How can the global trading system reconcile
trade and non-trade (societal) values? This is a systemic structural problem
whose solution requires more than a conventional bargain based on routine
strategic cost-benefit analysis under each member’s trade balance sheet.304
Rather, it necessitates much collective thinking and soul-searching dialogue
among trading nations, and their nationals (traders), on such cognitive
issues as values, goals, and the collective identity of the global trading
system.
For example, the old paradigm might ascribe the failure to reach an
international antitrust agreement in the WTO to the “great power divide”
between the U.S. and the EU.305 As seen in high-profile cases such as
GE/Honeywell and Microsoft, these two jurisdictions cannot form a firm
consensus on how much the government should intervene to rectify the
market dominance of powerful firms.306 Under the realist logic, powerful
members such as the U.S. and the EU could not reconcile between
themselves.307 Yet the old paradigm still fails to present how in the future
such a clash could be avoided and a consensus formed. More importantly,
realism fails to highlight the lack of genuine regulatory dialogue between
these two jurisdictions on this subject: two parties are simply not talking.
The old paradigm’s status quo bias makes it difficult to envision new
possibilities of regulatory cooperation in this sensitive area. Behavioral
changes necessary to global antitrust cooperation may ensue only after
much collective thinking and discourse among regulators on critical issues
such as the nature of market(s), the definition of (fair) competition, and the
ultimate role (goal) of the government in a free market economy.308
Finally, the status quo bias in the realist-Gesellschaftian paradigm
tends to naturalize the marginalization of less powerful trading nations.
303

See notably Kono, supra note 302 (contending that
protectionist by restricting import supply).
304
See generally Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade
Moving Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625
linkage (“trade and …”) issues from a constitutional perspective).
305
Bradford, supra note 288, at 17.
306
Id.
307
See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION:
GLOBALIZATION (2010).
308
Id.

core NTBs are clearly
and Social Regulation:
(2005) (approaching the
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Such marginalization, prone to create frustration and resentment from
developing countries,309 innately militates against its normative agenda, in
particular its integrationist telos.310 For example, under the realistGesellschaftian view, developed countries’ power-based threats forced
developing countries to accept the protection of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS) in the Uruguay Round. By linking the intellectual property rights
(IPR) to development assistance programs such as Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), rich countries pressured developing countries into
accepting the IPR protection regime.311 In addition, rich countries’
“aggressive unilateralism,” represented by Section 301, might potentially
prosecute developing countries’ lack of IPR protection as a kind of unfair
trade.312 While this realpolitik discourse may explain how and why the
TRIPS regime came to light in the WTO, it nonetheless tends to overlook
critical socio-legal debates as to whether the TRIPS’ existence within the
WTO is normatively justified313 and how WTO members perceive, and
eventually reform, this new regime, as revealed in certain contentious
issues, such as AIDS drugs and human health.314
As the Hobbesian “competition bias”315 still characterizes WTO
trade negotiations under the old paradigm, it has also contributed to an everdeepening chasm between the North and the South. The current global
309

See B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the
Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (arguing that a “transnational capitalist class” (TCC)
has recently shaped international economic norms and institutions to its advantage and that
these imperial developments deepened the North-South divide); B.S. Chimni, Co-option
and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
799, 806 (2005) (observing that an emerging notion of global administrative law is an
essential character of imperial international laws and institutions).
310
Emmerson, supra note 97, at 146, 150 (arguing that the “Realist view presupposes a
given order” reflecting powerful state interests and that this concern with maintaining the
status quo is irreconcilable with the WTO’s economic integration objective).
311
Bradford, supra note 288, at 15.
312
Id.
313
Id. at 3.
314
The patent protections afforded to AIDS drugs under the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is a contentious issue with several
African WTO members. See e.g., Ben Sihanya, Patents, Parallel Importation and
Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Experience of Kenya, in MANAGING THE
CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES (2005). Regarding the
relationship between WTO Agreements and various contentious health policies such as
tobacco, drugs, and intellectual property rights, see WTO AGREEMENTS & PUBLIC HEALTH:
A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO AND THE WTO SECRETARIAT (2002), available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_e.pdf.
315
See Uncertainty, supra note 54, at 538 (quoting Charles L. Glaser, Realists as
Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, 19 INT’L SECURITY 50, 58 (1994-1995).
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financial crisis has aggravated development concerns due to the comatose
Doha “Development” Round. The world’s poor are hit hardest by these
double troubles—the financial crisis and the comatose Doha Round—in our
time.316 As experts predict a long period of jobless recovery from the
financial crisis, the nascent political zeal for protectionism is likely to
gather speed in the future.317 The real peril of protectionism nowadays is
that it is rapidly “marginalizing” poor people from the mainstream global
trading community.318 Shocking anecdotes abound. The U.S. currently
collects more tariffs from Bangladesh than from France!319 While the EU’s
subsidy on every cow is $2 a day,320 more than half of the world’s human
population lives with the same amount or less per day.321 Most
problematically, rich countries’ protectionism falls on poor countries’ only
lifeline products, such as African cotton,322 Moldovan fruits,323 and
Cambodian garments.324
Yet enhancing market access for poor countries’ main exports is not
asking a “special favor,” but merely “playing by the [trade] rules.” 325 Many
government subsidies in rich countries violate both the spirit and the letter
of trade rules. Nonetheless, rich countries, under the frustrating logic of
mercantilist quid pro quo (reciprocity), repeatedly find fault with the lack of
concessions from the poor countries even in the current “development”
round.326
316

See Cho, supra note 2.
Id.
318
Id.
319
Dustin Smith, The Truth About Industrial Country Tariffs, 39 FIN. & DEV. (2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/smith.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2012).
320
James Lamont, Doha Deal “Close to Conclusion”, FIN. TIMES, Sep. 3, 2009, at 4
(quoting Dhruv Sawhney, a past president of the Confederation of Indian Industry).
321
POPULATION
REFERENCE
BUREAU,
http://www.prb.org/Journalists/PressReleases/2005/MoreThanHalftheWorldLivesonLessTh
an2aDayAugust2005.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
322
See Stitched Up: African Irritation at Rich Countries’ Cotton Subsidies, 368
ECONOMIST, Jul. 26, 2003, at 71.
323
See Moldova’s Poverty: Outsiders Aren’t Helping, 366 ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003,
at 48.
324
See David Woods, Two Queries – and Same Answer – for U.S. Textile Lobbyists,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at 12.
325
Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, Summary of December 13, 2005, Day 1:
Conference Opens Formally and Ministers Consult on Industrial Goods,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_13dec_e.htm.
326
See Oxfam Press Release, Responsibility on EU and US to Deliver Fair Trade
Rules
for
2006,
Dec.
20,
2005,
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2005/pr051220_hongkong.
317
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In sum, although the Kantian enlightenment pursuing collective
prosperity via free trade had inspired the launch of the GATT prototype,
power politics still fuels, and is fueled by, the aforementioned mercantilist
trend. This depressing pattern is confirmed by the recent protectionist
trends in the aftermath of the global financial crisis327 as well as the
deadlock of the Doha Round talks.328 Therefore, WTO members’ primary
goal in their trade policies remains the maximization of the alleged national
economic interests, even at the expense of their trading partners’ welfare.
As long as WTO members perceive and construct international trade
basically as a mercantilist enterprise, this shrinks the civilizing power of
legal discourse in international trade relations.329 To that extent, the global
trading system is never immune to the old Hobbesian economic
balkanization.330
This structural dilemma confronted by the WTO tends to call for a
new paradigm in understanding the global trading system, which will be
discussed in the next section.
D. Toward the WTO’s Community (Gemeinschaft)
1. The WTO as a Community of Law
The aforementioned analytical and normative dilemmas of the old
paradigm call for a new paradigm that focuses on certain cognitive
properties of social interaction—such as ideas, norms and culture—among
social actors (states). The WTO is not a mere aspect of its members’
327

See Simon Evenett, Managed Exports and the Recovery of World Trade: The 7th
GTA Report, CTR. FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH (Sep. 16, 2010),
http://www.globaltradealert.org/sites/default/files/GTA7.pdf; Christian Henn & Brad
McDonald, Crisis Protectionism: The Observed Trade Impact, VOX (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5960 (emphasizing that new protectionist
measures, such as bailouts and buy national policies, are not suitable for conventional
modeling frameworks (partial or general equilibrium models) and therefore might not
render a full picture of crisis protectionism).
328
See generally Cho, supra note 2.
329
See A New Agenda, supra note 217, at 66 (noting that “a legal vacuum resulting
from a lack of discourse tends to push international commercial relations and dynamics
beyond the realm of law”).
330
See e.g., Ernesto Zedillo, The Multilateral Trading System: A Response to Its
Challengers, in THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL TRADE, MURKY PROTECTIONISM, AND THE
CRISIS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE G20 15 (Richard Baldwin & Simon J. Evenett eds.,
2009) (observing the economic balkanization of the post-crisis protectionism now appears
to be more a “possible scenario” than a mere “historical reminiscence”).
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actions and interactions like a contract (Gesellschaft), but rather a systemic
social construct (Gemeinschaft) that ascribes cognitive values (meanings) to
members’ behaviors.331 In this regard, the WTO “cannot be reduced to the
activities carried out in its name” such as ministerial conferences and trade
negotiations: “[i]t consists also of relatively enduring rules and norms that
these actions draw upon, reproduce, and transform.”332
As discussed above, the new WTO system has already
demonstrated, albeit still in an inchoate stage, these constructivist attributes
in the GATT/WTO’s record of institutional development. This nascent
constructivist turn within the WTO must further develop into a fully
operating paradigm. Only then can the new paradigm, which departs from
the global Gesellschaft and builds the WTO’s Gemeinschaft, engage in a
more precise analysis of trading nations’ behaviors as well as propose more
normatively sound solutions to various normative challenges confronted by
the global trading system. Constructing a new paradigm (the WTO’s
Gemeinschaft) from burgeoning institutional-sociological transformations
within the WTO system should begin with its very object and purpose
(telos).333
With the launch of the WTO, this normative-cognitive parameter
has become increasingly prominent both in the legal text and the
jurisprudence. For example, the WTO Agreement employed a more mature
telos, i.e., “an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system”334 than the narrow and sterilized one under the old GATT
embodying a pro-trade bias, i.e., “the substantial reduction of tariffs and
other barriers to trade.”335
Likewise, WTO tribunals often adopt
“teleological” interpretations to make sense of particular decisions against a
broad theme of WTO’s object and purpose.336 After all, as long as the
WTO remains a legal institution, it cannot fully separate its regulation of
participants’ behaviors from collective goals.337
331

See Dessler, supra note 167, at 462.
Id.
333
Historical institutionalism lends insights to the WTO’s transformation from a
Gesellschaft to a Gemeinschaft. Institutions like the WTO, with its historically embedded
norms and practices, can be seen as “frozen decisions” or “history encoded into rules”
where rules are the “summaries of past decisions.” March & Olsen, supra note 17, at 741;
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3 (1955).
334
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, pmbl.
335
GATT pmbl. (1948).
336
Report of the Panel, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, adopted on May 20, 1996 WT/DS2/9; United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, adopted on Nov. 6, 1998 WT/DS58.
337
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 41, at 151 (observing that moral rules
332
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Markedly, the WTO’s integrationist telos closely corresponds with
its rule-oriented transformation explicit in its new treaty setting.338 For
example, the new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
eliminated the veto power in order to secure a normative efficacy within the
system. Under the old GATT dispute resolution mechanism, a WTO
panel’s decision was legally binding only when all GATT contracting
parties, including a losing one, agreed to adopt the decision. This was yet
another symptom of power-driven Gesellschaft since, unsurprisingly,
powerful parties such as the U.S. often vetoed the adoption of GATT panel
decisions when they were the losing party. To remedy this lack of
normative deficiency, the new WTO DSU eliminated this veto system and
made the adoption process automatic.
Ironically, the recent global financial crisis has only amplified the
fateful necessity of a collective bond within the global trading system.
While the crisis has negatively affected developing countries and their
people, the post-crisis situation (“new normal”)339 has ironically put
developing countries and their economic players in a position of a
“solution” on account of their enormous growth potential that is superior to
crisis-stricken developed countries.340 Developing countries must fully
realize their development potential by actively connecting with the WTO’s
community, i.e., by mainstreaming international trade, which will in turn
engender global growth. In this regard, although the new paradigm alone
could not eliminate the development deficit in the immediate future, it could
nonetheless stimulate a number of new ideas and projects that will shape a
more desirable institutional path for the WTO by changing the way in
which we understand the world trading system.
This normative-teleological turn of the WTO warrants a
constructivist interpretation. Under constructivism, how WTO members
understand their national interests would depend on the WTO’s norms and
social structure.341 “Social structures have an inherently discursive
“express a universal will pure and simple,” laws also express “the particular wills of
members of a particular legal community,” and that a legal community’s political will
expresses “an intersubjectively shared form of life, existing interest positions, and
pragmatically chosen ends”).
338
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109–11 (1997).
339
See Ian Davis, The New Normal, MCKINSEY Q., Mar. 2009,
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_new_normal_2326.
340
Robert Zoellick, Pittsburgh Should Be a Turning Point for the Poor, FIN. TIMES,
Sep. 24, 2009.
341
Checkel, supra note 6, at 325–26 (noting the constructivist emphasis on the role of
social structures and norms).
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dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons and selfunderstandings that agents bring to their actions.”342 In other words, the
WTO's norms and social structure “constitute” WTO members’ interests
and preferences. Being a WTO member is not a mere sum of rights and
privileges under the WTO agreements. A WTO membership also connotes
certain social benefits like belongingness, assurance, and even prestige
derived from a certain social status in the world trading system. This
explains why so many countries—in particular, developing countries such
as China, Vietnam, and Russia—have been so eager to become WTO
members.343
The constructivist interpretation of GATT/WTO centering on social
—cognitive and intersubjective—parameters generates communitarian
(Gemeinschaftian) images of GATT/WTO, such as “dense and demanding
social ties” and “common beliefs in an idea system.”344 First of all, the
enhanced visibility of shared goals (free trade and market integration)
manifest both in the WTO text and its jurisprudence helps WTO members
converge their normative expectations, which is a prerequisite for building a
collective identity of community.345 Perhaps the very fact that the WTO is
342

See Wendt, supra note 33, at 359.
China became a WTO member in 2001. See Member Information: China and the
WTO, http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm. Vietnam has been a
member of the WTO since 2007. See Member Information: Viet Nam and the WTO,
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/vietnam_e.htm. The Russian Federation was
recently accepted as a WTO member in December 2011. See Accessions: Russian
Federation, http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm.
344
See Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the
Community Concept, 19 SOC. THEORY 1, 3–4 (2001). Employing Emile Durkheim's
“disaggregating” theorem, Steven Brint modernized the notion of Gemeinschaft. The
disaggregating theorem defines a community (Gemeinschaft) as a set of certain salient
attributes in human relations, rather than an actual physical locus, such as a rural town. Id.
at 1–2. Brint’s new approach is an attempt to overcome the narrow binarism from which
Fernando Tönnis’ dyad (Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft) suffers, while still capturing in the
Gemeinschaftian concept a basic aspiration for mutual support originating directly from
our own humanness. Id. at 1. But cf. Elisabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of
International Governance, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 123 (1995) (rejecting the
possibility of an “international community” and instead positing the notion of
“international society” on the ground that the international society lacks the “commonness”
which can only be found in “national communities”). In other words, Brint’s approach
offers a theoretical lens through which we can construct a Gemeinschaft with the WTO,
which is often classified, and criticized at the same time, as a global Gesellschaft. Two
critical community properties, inter alia, tend to provide such lens. Naturally, these
properties correspond with constructivists’ intersubjectivity thesis.
345
See Carmody, supra note 256, at 535 (characterizing the WTO as a “constitutional”
instrument which “seeks to protect the distribution of expectations concerning the traderelated behavior of governments”).
343
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the most successful international organization in the postwar era,346 as
measured by its continuing operational effectiveness as well as everexpanding agendas and membership, speaks to the potential communitarian
nature of the WTO.
Importantly, this communitarian solidarity reifies, and at the same
time is reified by, a well-developed and sophisticated set of norms as a
communicative device whose “generative grammar” and “underlying
principles of order and meaning” shape the contour of GATT/WTO’s
institutional development.347 WTO norms as a communication device
denote the “logic of appropriateness” in a sociological sense, which derives
from certain “patterns of practice” as well as “shared understandings or
behavioral expectations.”348 In sum, WTO members see themselves as a
“we” bound by common norms as a “symbolic mode of communication.”349
Therefore, in this WTO’s Gemeinschaft, trading partners should be
perceived more as “customers, suppliers, and potential collaborators instead
of competitive threats.”350
Once trading partners share the same
communicative foundation, their relationships could be more cooperative
than competitive because such foundation provides the “structure of
meanings that defines action” in our common realm.351
Since the WTO discourse assumes a legal vehicle (such as rhetoric,
arguments, and narratives) to channel individual ideas to collective
action,352 the WTO’s “logic of communication”353 or its members’
“communicative action”354 cannot be but through law. Here, an analogy of
language is useful for the constructivist understanding of the WTO’s
community as a community of law.355 Certain “semantic regularities,”356
such as case law and precedents, administer the WTO’s community in that
346

Rachman, supra note 297.
International Regimes, supra note 197, at 390.
348
See Brunnée & Toope, supra note 36, at 67; March & Olsen, supra note 17;
Finnemore, supra note 35; Karol Soltan, A Social Science That Does Not Exist, in
REDISCOVERING FULLER 393 (William J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999).
349
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 36, at 60, n.176.
350
Ikenson, supra note 266, at 14.
351
Dessler, supra note 167, at 455–56 (observing that when one follows constitutive
rules, one “make[s] oneself understood according to the structure of meanings that defines
action in that realm”).
352
See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 12.
353
See Schmidt, supra note 8, at 303–26.
354
See supra note 213.
355
Cf. Supranational Adjudication, supra note 212, at 367 (observing that effective
supranational adjudication tends to nurture a “community of law” in the human rights area
among private parties and courts of the European Union).
356
See Goodrich, supra note 277, at 139.
347
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this WTO jurisprudence features “lexico-grammatical” aspects357 of WTO
and thus shape meanings of the WTO text within the WTO’s own sociocultural context.
The WTO norms as “linguistic phenomena” are
“embedded”358 in the WTO’s history, institutional evolution, and internal
dynamics.359 Thus WTO members “work [] together creatively to refashion
the linguistically structured symbols of social cohesion which serve as the
resources for intersubjective experience, with the aim of motivating
action.”360 As far as the WTO is concerned, a community-building process
is a norm-building process. Here, the WTO norms hold the “duality of
praxis” in that they are used to transmit intentional claims and arguments of
members, and at the same time, they reproduce themselves and become
taken for granted.361
The growing prominence of international trade law, both in
academia and in practice, helps this lingua franca of international trade law
circulate farther.362 For example, Professor John Jackson, the leading
international trade law scholar whose critical influence played a critical role
in building the current form of the WTO system, launched the Journal of
International Economic Law (JIEL) in 1998 to lead and develop academic
discourses on international trade law issues.363 A few years later, none but
the WTO Secretariat itself embarked on the publication of the World Trade
Review (WTR) for a similar purpose.364 Importantly, these academic
initiatives have helped spread international trade law discourses not only to
scholars but also to policymakers, business circles, and the general public.
These WTO Secretariat staff, WTO tribunal members, trade
lawyers, trade law scholars may be labeled “discursive agents”365 in that
357

See Goodrich, supra note 277, at 177.
See Goodrich, supra note 277, at 138.
359
Gerald Postema describes this sociological aspect of norms as a “congruence
thesis.” Postema argues that “legal norms and authoritative directives can guide selfdirected social interaction only if they are broadly congruent with the practices and patterns
of interaction extant in the society in generally.” Gerald J. Postema, Implicit Law, 13 LAW
& PHIL. 265, 273–74 (1994).
360
Francis J. Mootz III, Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric, in
REDISCOVERING FULLER 442 (William J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999).
361
ROY BHASKAR, THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM, 38, 43–44 (3d ed. 1998)
(observing that WTO norms, as a language, form a “duality of praxis” where they are
employed to transmit ideas).
362
See Sovereignty, supra note 73, at 46 (observing that international economic law
(IEL) might be the most “populated” subject of international law in terms of the “numbers
of persons and hours spent working on IEL, as well as the amount of practice”).
363
See 1 J. INT’L ECONOMIC L. 1 (1998).
364
See 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 3 (2002).
365
A number of scholars have identified this phenomenon under various labels. See
generally Schmidt, supra note 48, at 2. See also Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic
358
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they collectively preserve and develop trade law ideas and discourses in
what Vivien Schmidt calls a “coordinative policy sphere.”366 As “sentient”
agents,367 they do not mechanically apply pre-existing legal texts but
creatively criticize, deliberate, and construct policies and norms. Granted,
those discursive agents may initially confront each other with different
“terms” of discourse as their meaning structures channeling their thoughts
and actions diverge.368 Yet the dialectical interactions among themselves,
which is endemic to the discourse, tend to lead it toward a converging point.
Notably, discourses transpiring within the WTO by those discursive agents
do not only concern particular policies or programs; they also touch upon a
deeper “public philosophy” that is often “left unarticulated as background
knowledge” to most actors in the WTO.369 Therefore, when these
discursive agents (such as the WTO Appellate Body members) reconstruct
trade norms via “constitutional” adjudication against parochial interests,
they explicitly or implicitly engage in a discourse on the very telos of the
WTO.370
From this standpoint, trade norms are no longer exogenously given
as mere records of a sovereign contract. Instead, trade norms are now
“endogenously” self-generating via intersubjective, communicative, and
cultural discourses among participants of the world trading community,
which connotes not only state actors but also individual economic players,
such as producers, investors, importers, consumers, and even scholars and
policymakers.371 A plethora of discursive practices and rituals, most of
which have been institutionalized as norms—substantive (such as
Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) (“epistemic
communities” of elites with shared ideas); POLICY CHANGE AND LEARNING: AN
ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH (Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993)
(“advocacy coalitions” of elites with shared ideas and policy access); MARGARET E. KECK
& KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (“advocacy networks” of activists contesting ideas in
international politics); Neil Fligstein & Iona Mara-Drita, How to Make a Market:
Reflections on the European Union’s Single Market Program, 102 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1
(1996) (“entrepreneurs”); Jobert, supra note 194 (“mediators”).
366
See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 2.
367
Id. at 3.
368
See Schmidt, supra note 8, at 303–09; WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1993).
369
See Schmidt, supra note 8, at 308.
370
See Schmidt, supra note 48, at 12; Cho, supra note 276 (viewing that the WTO was
able to reconstruct trade norms regarding antidumping practices despite the United States’
sovereignty-maximizing interpretation of its zeroing practice).
371
Cf. GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (highlighting private parties’ influences in the WTO dispute
resolution process).
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jurisprudence) and procedural (such as the DSU)—over the past six
decades, are reflections of the social order within the context of the
WTO.372 “They are signals and symbols of the appropriateness of events,
not in the sense that what happened needs to be viewed as desirable or
pleasant, but in the sense that what happened can be viewed as having
occurred in the way things happen.”373
Ironically, certain material incentives also contribute to this
development of endogenous legal discourses. As individual economic
players, or transnational businesspeople, are saddled with cross-border
mergers, multinational joint-ventures, and global supply chains, they
understandably seek stability and predictability informed by rule of law,
such as lex mercatoria, rather than unpredictable domestic politics. For the
same reason, individual economic players also tend to have the WTO’s
modus operandi based on a consistent set of norms equivalent to a jus
gentium or common law of international trade rather than on whimsical
political contingencies.374 As Jürgen Habermas aptly observed, normative
discourses can “transform mentalities” of government official and citizens,
and thus internalize the “new legal construction of the international
community.”375
2. The Egalitarian Content of International Trade Law
Critically, the ultimate destination of this cognitive-communicative
construction of international trade law is a long-forgotten “egalitarian
content” of law.376 Legal discourse retains its egalitarian nature with
inclusiveness and perspective-taking.377 This embedded egalitarianism has
largely been eclipsed by realism, under which law is merely “reflections of
unstable and shifting interest constellations among powers.”378 In this
sense, constructivism inoculates the “pernicious effects of the self-interest
theory” which “bring[] out the worst in us” by “encouraging us to expect

372

March & Olsen, supra note 17, at 742.
Martha S. Feldman & James G. March, Information in Organizations as Signal and
Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171 (1981).
374
See CHO, supra note 303 (contending that a jus gentium of international trade
generates legitimacy by transcending narrow and overly contextualized legal doctrines
when managing the clash between free markets and state regulation).
375
DIVIDED WEST, supra note 30, at 177.
376
Id. at 131.
377
Id. at 185.
378
Id. at 167.
373
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the worst in others.”379
The current WTO system has at least demonstrated some
possibilities for a kind of egalitarian legal discourse. For example, the
WTO’s High Court—the Appellate Body—highlights the vitality of taking
into account the predicaments faced by other trading in implementing one’s
own domestic policies when such policies exert negative externalities on
those trading partners.380 The Appellate Body mandates a regulating
country to reach out to its trading partners and establish some cooperative
arrangements to avoid these negative (trade-restrictive) impacts.
Cooperation, which may be defined as one party’s behavioral change
“contingent on” that of others, is a benign, albeit not inevitable,
consequence of discourse.381 For example, the WTO’s side agreements,
such as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS), impose on WTO members a plethora of procedural
disciplines, such as notification, transparency, and reason-giving. These
disciplines intend to facilitate regulatory dialogue and cooperation between
regulating countries and those affected by the former’s regulations.382 In
short, these legal—both textual and interpretive—changes under the new
WTO system signify a paradigmatic shift from control to communication.383
The aforementioned egalitarian trade discourse symbolizes an
institutional maturity under which the WTO can grow out of its narrowminded pro-trade bias and embrace a “trade constitution” within the WTO
system.384 On account of this emerging communicative paradigm, a new
form of cognitive connection tends to emerge between exporting and
importing (regulating) countries that enhances trade sensitivity in the
latter’s regulatory process. With such trade sensitivity, the importing
(regulating) country is more willing to consider any negative trade impact
379
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that its regulation may exert on the exporting country. Here, various
avenues of legal discourse under the WTO system, such as the notification
and enquiry function under the SPS Agreement, help both importing and
exporting countries stay tuned to the same cognitive radar. Eventually, such
a cognitive bond between importing and exporting countries empowers the
WTO to overcome an original pro-trade bias under the old GATT by
contributing to a more effective reconciliation between trade and non-trade
(e.g., the environment) values. This normative dimension of a trade
constitution cannot be fully captured by Gesellschaftian properties (i.e.,
interest, bargain, and negotiation).
Concededly, constructivism cannot simply assume away Hobbesian
competition. The enduring protectionism may still undermine the emerging
Gemeinschaftian discourse within the WTO community of law. For
example, powerful trading nations want to negotiate away their compliance
with an adjudicated decision. The U.S. defied the WTO and refused to fully
comply with the 2004 WTO Appellate Body decision ordering the
elimination of certain cotton subsidies. Instead, the U.S. linked these
subsidy cuts to the agricultural negotiation under the current Doha
Round.385 Therefore, one should not equate a new paradigm with the
reality.386 There may still be some gaps between the idealist structure
envisioned by the new paradigm (constructivism) and a certain type of
reality that the conventional paradigm (realism) may explain better. As the
former GATT official Jan Tumlir aptly observed, WTO members might be
tempted to discard any new way of thinking in the face of protectionist
pressure from their home fronts in a “cycle of learning and unlearning.”387
In this regard, constructivism could, and should, not claim a disciplinary
monopoly in understanding the WTO. After all, any communitarian bond
in the WTO might be loose enough to yield occasionally to materialistic
considerations.
Nonetheless, the new paradigm does provide us with creative
pathways toward a better future. The constructivist narrative on the WTO’s
community (Gemeinschaft) based on legal discourse offers a powerful
avenue in reconstructing the WTO’s nomos in a way that can effectively
transform mercantilist politics. The WTO’s community could raise the cost
of maintaining mercantilism-protectionism by altering the nature of national
385
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interests in trade relations. In the WTO community of law, a wide array of
individual economic players, such as importers, transporters, insurers,
bankers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, can benefit from an orderly
and stable legal environment, while politically well-connected domestic
producers might still prefer lobbying politicians for special interests.
Therefore, in the WTO’s community where both trading nations and
individual economic players interact and communicate with one another via
a language of (international trade) law, mercantilism-protectionism results
in an enormous decrease in the collective welfare—both domestically and
internationally—only to serve a handful of special interests.
In sum, the WTO’s community as a community of law could help
modify the Gesellschaftian nature of power and interest. Then, it can serve
a broader circle of economic participants within the global trading system
by envisaging an expanded horizon of collective gains from trade that used
to be eclipsed by the old mercantilist-protectionist paradigm.388
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the old paradigm on IOs characterized by
realist political bargain (Gesellschaft) cannot fully capture new social
realities around contemporary IOs in which ideational factors, such as ideas,
values, culture, and norms, have become more salient and influential not
only in explaining but also in prescribing state behaviors. In response to
this challenge, the Article offers a new paradigm informed by
constructivism that highlights a reflective, intersubjective communication
among IO members and consequent norm-building process. Under this new
paradigm, one can understand an IO as a “community” (Gemeinschaft), not
as a mere contractual instrument of its member states. The Article applies
the new paradigm to the WTO as it explains the WTO’s institutional
evolution from a power-oriented, tariff-reducing contract to a normoriented world trading community.
The paradigm shift proposed in this Article holds both descriptive
and normative connotations. On the one hand, the Article highlights the
increasing unfitness of the old paradigm as it elucidates new social realities
around IOs. For example, the Article argues that the constructivist
understanding of the WTO system could explain, better than realism, why
trade disputes, albeit often escalated, do not entail trade wars akin to the
interwar economic balkanization. The “complex interdependence” among
WTO members, which is defined by its characteristic high frequency388
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density of their interactions, multiple issues involved, and multiple channels
of communication (private and public; formal and informal), has nurtured a
solid communitarian bond harnessed by sophisticated trade norms.389 This
fateful tiding tends to make the use of retaliation less practical, if not
completely obsolete.390 This complex interdependence in trade relations,
evidenced by such phenomena as global supply/production chains, crossborder mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investments, and
international trade finances, has shifted WTO members’ worldviews from a
zero-sum world to a positive-sum world.391 Under this unique condition,
WTO members tend to define their self-interests differently from what
realists would do.392
On the other hand, however, the Article also sheds light on the
future of IOs—how to redesign and reform the current IOs. Polemical as
they may seem, the aforementioned diverging views on IOs denote a
fundamentally paradigmatic concern. In other words, these different views
betray certain assumptions that an inquirer unconsciously holds in
constructing the reality around an IO.393 We may see only what we are
prepared to see.394 Moreover, how we understand the reality, in turn,
determines how we change it. Given the ubiquity of IOs, whose coverage
ranges from the financial crisis (International Monetary Fund)395 to
development (World Bank),396 in the era of globalization,397 one may not
389
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take lightly this ontological inquiry of the IO.
For example, the old paradigm, if left unchecked, will lead
eventually to a normative tension among trading nations by aggravating
mercantilist competition, as witnessed in the current Doha crisis.398 As long
as negotiators are obsessed with a mirage of perfect “bargain,” the
normative foundation of the Doha Round, i.e., “development,” will never
fully materialize. Here, the new paradigm is capable of providing us with a
creative pathway toward a better future. The power of discourse,
communication, learning, and enlightenment in the WTO’s legal
community is capable of closing the frustrating gaps between trade norms
and trade realities. Only this endogenous, self-generating process can
emancipate the WTO system from an exogenous realist, and at the same
time defeatist, trap under which “legal provisions can be nothing other than
reflections of unstable and shifting interest constellations among
powers.”399
In conclusion, the new paradigm’s constructivist narratives toward
an IO’s community (Gemeinschaft) offer a powerful avenue in
reconstructing an IO in a way that can effectively address chronic
cooperation deficiencies that an IO is and will be experiencing in the future.
Within the community, states do not need to agree on everything: they
could just “get used to” and eventually “make sense of” one another.400
After all, the main message of the new paradigm is a “moral” thesis, which
aspires to espouse “human progress” via IOs.401
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